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/ .tec and 
interpretations of the operative provisions of statutes \. -. empowered : administer 
("special laws") entitled to deference? 
- _ ,n e r r c ( j i n n o l making lindm^ -n laking 
evidence of Mountain Bell's conduct and actions barred K their failure to ;:mc them, on 
rehearing? 
I VV'ouiil lequirinc; :i refund of rates found just and reasonable in final rate orders 
constitute prohibited retroactive rate making? 
Iprior to July of 1988, The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company did business as 
Mountain Bell. Since then, it has done business as U S WEST Communications. Both names are used 
in the record. The company will be referred to as Mountain Bell in this brief. 
4. Can the Commission order reparations of rates found just and reasonable in 
final rate orders where the rates were collected prior to any finding that they had become 
unjust and unreasonable? 
5. Is the Commission's conclusion that none of the exceptions to the rule against 
retroactive rate making apply in this case within the tolerable limits of reason? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues presented by this review: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(l)(1986), 54-7-15(2)(b)(Supp. 1989) and 54-7-20(l)(1986). They 
are reproduced in full in Appendix 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 15, 1988, a Request for Agency Action was filed with the Commis-
sion during the course of hearings in Docket No. 88-049-07 (a Mountain Bell general rate 
case). It requested that the Commission order Mountain Bell to refund all earnings during 
1987 and 1988 in excess of the rate of return utilized by the Commission in setting rates 
in the prior general rate case order issued December 31, 1985 in Case No. 85-049-02 
(M1985 Rate Order"). Resellers and others joined in the request. 
The Commission determined that the request did not comply with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-9(3)(b) (Supp. 1989). The Commission, without objection, ordered that Resellers 
would have until November 2, 1988 to file a request that complied with the statute, that 
the request should be filed in a new proceeding (Docket No. 88-049-18), and that the case 
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The petitions alleged that the Order was in error because it did not accept Resellers' 
arguments; however, they did not assert that the Order was in error because: (1) Mountain 
Bell had misled regulators, (2) the Commission had failed to make a finding of fact 
regarding Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation or (3) the Commission 
needed to take evidence of Mountain Bell's conduct before it could enter the Order. (R. 
at 685-96; [Tel-America Appendix 3; MCI Appendix 4]) The petitions for review or 
rehearing were denied by the Commission on May 18, 1989, on the grounds that the relief 
requested in the Complaint was not authorized under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 and that 
it would constitute retroactive rate making. (R. at 703-05 [Appendix 5]) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. 1985 General Rate Case. During 1985, rate hearings were conducted in which 
the rates and charges of Mountain Bell were extensively reviewed based upon a 1985 test 
year. On December 31, 1985, the Commission issued the 1985 Rate Order finding certain 
rates just and reasonable and ordering Mountain Bell to implement them immediately. No 
party challenged or appealed the 1985 Rate Order, and the rates established by it were 
implemented immediately. 
One of several factors considered by the Commission in the 1985 Rate Order was 
Mountain Bell's cost of equity capital. The Commission found that a rate of return on 
equity in the range of 14.0 to 14.5 percent was reasonable and that 14.2 percent was the 
cost of equity capital that should be applied in determining rates in the case. 
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2. 1986 Earnine.v V-r surprisingly, the precise test-year revenues and costs that 
had been mC • •**. .:. >I '::;. ... ^ |irl 'mull it .iiiuuhli In lln1 ( \ urn IIIIIPAH n i iiiii ill I * ><SS 
R ate Order were not realized by Mountain B ^ n. ubL. ;x nv of the differences were the 
result of many small deviations; others resulted frnni more .significant occurrences wl lich 
effect of these changes was that 
Mountain Bell's 1986 revenues were approximates. >L "^  -1 '!" f; ?ess than the amount that 
would have V ^ " necessary to ach;. v .. *'X5 
^For example, in 1986 Mountain J^,, uJwj,;^ „., ..;:; •. i< m<.-n; ,nnanur:^!i program,. 
Implementation of the program resulted in decreases in salary and employee benciit expenses and increases 
in pension expenses, There were also salary and wage increases in i9S6 which resulted in an increase in 
operating expenses. Increased competition in intrastate long distance resulted in a decrease in toil revenues 
and a smaller increase in access revenues, (R. at 470) The shift of expenses from the interstate u* intrastate 
jurisdiction as a result of separations changes mandated by the Federal Communications Commissi^  n 
("FCC") resulted in increased expenses. TRA-86 eliminated inw^ment tax credits <jiiective January I. ;• ^ 
resulting in an increase in Mountain Bell's 1986 tax expense. (R at 5 VMi [Appendix 6], 5.^ 44 Appendix 
" 11 
^It is not .i{tj,suai K>i Liini.ii^ -v wiry from hu>c \ouv.<l rc\^onai-k- n une orders From 1980 through 
1986, Mountain Bell experienced the following returns on equity compared with the rates of return found 
reasonable H *"• ----. -r~ *•** •• -'vi'i""pi' r-^nnr vh^rifyii nwr the seven-war neriod of 591,414,000: 
Y ear 
1980 
vm 
. *^
1
-^  
1983 
V>84 
1986 
Regulatory 
R.O.E. 
11 45%» 
10.81% 
10.12% 
11.55% 
14.81% 
12.34%) 
11.95% 
Commission 
Found R.O.E. 
3.i)0 ' ; 
i4.5ir ; 
14.50% 
14.50%. 
14.75% 
14.75% 
14.20% 
Revenue 
Shortfall, (000) 
S 6,104 
S 18,404 
5 24,423 
S 16,746 
S (325) 
S 13,346 
;• * ~ " " i 
(R. at 469) A slightly different view of these n--mbcis w.r- pi-scnuu -vlww b\ \nc Division, (R. at 6031 
it reaches the same general conclusion as did these numbers pro\nj .*d ~*v Mountain Bel* 
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3. TRA-86 Investigation. Following passage of TRA-86, Utah regulators acted 
promptly to assess its impact on utility earnings. On December 9, 1986, the Commission 
wrote a letter to Mountain Bell requesting that it provide an analysis to the Division of the 
impact of TRA-86 on its earnings and revenue requirement. (R. at 528-29 [Appendix 8]) 
Mountain Bell responded to this letter on December 31, 1986 with an analysis of the 
impact of the various components of TRA-86 and other significant changes since the 1985 
test year on its earnings.4 (R. at 530-34 [Appendix 6]) 
On February 20, 1987, more than four months before the federal tax rate would 
change, the Division filed a report with the Commission. The Division believed it 
inappropriate to consider the impact of the post-test year change in tax expense without 
also considering changes in other ratemaking components.5 Based upon actual earnings 
through eleven months of 1986 and projected earnings for December of 1986 and 
considering all significant potential changes, the Division concluded that the expense 
reduction resulting from TRA-86 would be offset by a combination of other rate base, 
revenue and expense changes. It projected that the 1987 return on equity would be only 
10.94 percent. The Division, therefore, concluded that rates did not need to be reduced 
4TRA-86 made extensive changes in the tax laws. The most significant in terms of Mountain Bell's 
earnings were elimination of investment tax credits effective in 1986, elimination of various deductions 
effective January 1, 1987 and reduction of corporate tax rates from 46 to 34 percent effective July 1, 1987. 
The effective federal income tax rate for the entire year of 1987 was 39.95%. This rate was reflected in the 
monthly financial reports filed by Mountain Bell and utilized by the Division in its investigation starting with 
the January 1987 report. (R. at 537-39 [Appendix 7]) 
^This Division policy was rooted in Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 
1242 (Utah 1980) (reversing a Commission order increasing rates of Mountain Fuel Supply solely on the 
basis of across-the-board wage increases implemented less than one year after the last general rate case). 
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at that time, but stated that it would continue to monitor the earnings of Mountain Bell 
on n monthly I». i; '*- h> deumi I '< nil ni ill < red h (I*1 ii :i*^ >-44 
«
 !n Juni- \ 19S7. the Division submitted an tipdau*.: eport to _ , , r^mi^ i 
the earnings ml MM, I • lihlii". \{t\\\\ .*V\MS ot actual data iui 1986 
and final budget data for il'N". the f)i\isiv>n UUK.LJ^ * vr * -r savings thrr ~vni:Id result 
from TRA-86 vv.s. , , ^ i . . ,..,.u. v.ai.ui . : . to 
ninnum1 t\inii mummy UIMS. viX- a t 545-55
 LAppends 9]J 
?• September \ " '"" :\ Division filed a third report v\.i., ...^  vjn.iui^u n 
regarc ... " jon five months 
of actual data loi ±xjb7 <T d ^even month-, or budgeted data, the IJiwsion concluded that 
other changes since tue / v i\uU wt^v, , . . * • • • 
I'mm 1 RA s * >vouid continue iu monitor Mountain Bell's earnings on 
a monthly basis - at .^Mo} |Appendix 10]) 
< )n Septembci A\ 1% ", i!u"i m Ii ml let w 1 M I I, I'JiS ' HI mlhl> (iii.iiin.il n pi i, 
n mission wrote a letter to the Division noting that monthly reports for the period 
July 1986 through July 1987 indicated that Mountai, - ,:. *w)se to earning Ii i e xce ss 
cnod. I "he letter requested the Division 
to investigate Mountain Bell's financial returns to e\ aluate whether there was a need for 
"The Division's investigation of the impact of TR.A-S6 was based principally upon the financial reports 
routinely filed by the utilities on a monthly, annual and budget basis. However, the Commission and the 
Division requested, and Mountain Bell supplied, additional information, such as the December 31, 1986 
letter and schedules (Appendix 6), to assist in the investigation. 
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a rate case.7 The Division was specifically directed to evaluate not only the impact of 
TRA-86, but also other factors such as changes in capital markets, depreciation, early 
retirement programs and rate base offsets along with other relevant factors. (R. at 564 
[Appendix 11]) 
The Division informally obtained additional information from Mountain Bell and 
continued to monitor monthly reports. When actual data through August of 1987 became 
available in October 1987, it appeared to the Division and Mountain Bell that, if rates 
were not reduced, current earnings would likely be in excess of the 14.2 percent rate of 
return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order. Accordingly, both parties immediately 
commenced meetings regarding rate reductions that would, based upon the data then 
available, reduce earnings, on a going forward basis, to levels below a 14.2 percent return 
on equity. These meetings were not secret; no one else participated in them because there 
were no other parties to the investigation. As directed by the Commission, the Division 
and Mountain Bell considered factors in addition to TRA-86 which could have a significant 
impact on Mountain Bell's revenue requirement.8 
'MCI mischaracterizes this letter in stating that the Commission said "Mountain Bell was exceeding 
its authorized rate of return." MCI also implies that this investigation was of a different character than 
the investigation launched in December 1986. (MCI Br. at 8) Both were informal investigations. 
~For example, in January 1987, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Technical Bulletin 
No. 87-a proposing that the cost of post retirement health care and life insurance benefits be accrued during 
periods employees rendered service rather than expensed as incurred. It was not known when or how this 
change would be implemented. However, in late 1987, Mountain Bell estimated its potential liability 
associated with this change to be in excess of S4 million annually. In 1986, the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC") ordered revisions to the Uniform System of Accounts effective January 1, 1988. The 
extensive changes resulting from these revisions were estimated by Mountain Bell in late 1987 to increase 
its expenses by approximately $4 million annually. (R. at 542 [Appendix 7], 547 [Appendix 9]) 
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The meetings between :hc Division, and Mountain Bell resulted in a tariff filing by 
M O U n t a s I : . / ; J ^ ^ m l - C i . ' < f 11 U | H »M 11 tl , I l L l ! I U I I H I M I I I i| t, ! 11 *' H 11| | ]i 111| | i \ut 
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were interim, they could be adjusted up as well as down. The Division reaffirmed that it 
was generally opposed as a matter of policy to single item rate cases. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission ruled that it had no evidentiary 
basis to declare rates interim, and, therefore, denied the Committee's motion. The 
decision was not challenged on rehearing or appeal. 
On August 11, 1987, the Committee served data requests on Mountain Bell seeking 
information of the type and volume normally sought in a general rate case. Mountain Bell 
objected on the ground that the Committee had no authority to seek discovery during the 
course of an informal investigation by the Division. Following a hearing on the 
Committee's motion to compel, the Commission ruled that the motion should be held in 
abeyance pending the conclusion of the investigation, but directed the Division to provide 
the data it had utilized in reaching its conclusions to the Committee. (R. at 560-63) The 
Commission's decision on this discovery motion was not challenged.9 
In January 1988, the Committee requested information from the Division regarding 
the December 1987 rate decrease. No formal request was ever made of Mountain Bell 
for this information. 
5. 1988 General Rate Case. Mountain Bell continued to file monthly financial 
reports with the Commission and the Division. It also provided its 1988 budget to the 
Commission and the Division as soon as it was completed. The 1988 budget and the 
jThe basis for MCI's argument that Mountain Bell refused to provide information (MCI Br. at 43-44) 
was Mountain Bell's response to this Committee discovery request. (R. at 399, 655) In making this 
argument, MCI is improperly collaterally attacking the Commission's order. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14 
(1986). 
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monthly financial reports for the initial months of 1988 were delayed by the 
implementation of the FCC's Uniform System of Accounts Rewrite. The budget was not 
completed until April 1988, and the intrastate financial reports for January and February 
were not completed until May along with the March report.10 
After the Division had an opportunity to review the 1988 budget and the results for 
the first three months of 1988, it concluded that earnings under the new rates, adjusted for 
items it believed were justified, would result in earnings in excess of returns it believed 
were reasonable.11 On June 2, 1988, the Division filed a petition with the Commission 
requesting that a formal investigation into the reasonableness of Mountain Bell's rates be 
commenced. It was assigned Docket No. 88-049-07. 
On June 9, 1988, the Committee filed a petition in the same docket that the 
Commission immediately declare Mountain Bell's rates interim and hold a hearing to order 
an interim reduction in rates. Again, the Committee explained that, unless the Commission 
took this action, ratepayers would not be able to benefit from reduced rates until new rates 
were established at the conclusion of the proceeding. (R. at 565-67) 
luBefore monthly reports can be completed, revenues and costs must be separated between the 
interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. This is a complex process which normally results in monthly reports 
being completed one to two months following the conclusion of the month in question. The extensive 
changes in the Uniform System of Accounts effective January 1, 1988 rendered the prior separations 
procedures useless and required the development of a new system to be used on the 1988 budget and the 
1988 monthly reports. (R. at 476-77, 577-78) 
^TRA-86 was only one of many factors resulting in increased earnings. Among the factors 
contributing were continued cost cutting efforts by Mountain Bell, a reduction in pension expenses, a rate 
base that began declining in 1987 and unexpected increases in toll and access revenues. (R. at 477) 
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At a procedural hearing on July 5, 1988, the Commission decided to commence a 
general rate case, set a schedule for further proceedings and asked the parties to file legal 
memoranda on the authority of the Commission to grant the interim relief sought by the 
Committee. Memoranda were filed and a hearing was held on July 22, 1988. The 
Commission issued its order on August 2, 1988 denying the Committee's petition12 but 
establishing a rebuttable presumption that all earnings from August 1, 1988 forward in 
excess of 14.2 percent were unjust and unreasonable and subject to refund. (R. at 893-
94) Mountain Bell applied for reconsideration of that order, but no other party challenged 
it. 
During the pendency of the foregoing matters, the Division and the Committee 
continued discovery and, with Mountain Bell, commenced negotiations to settle the revenue 
requirement aspect of the rate case. All parties recognized that the current rates of 
Mountain Bell would likely result in annualized earnings in excess of the 14.2 percent rate 
of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order, and all parties desired to reduce rates 
as quickly as possible if agreement could be reached on a reasonable level of reduction. 
The parties were able to reach agreement and, on August 22, 1988, presented their 
stipulation to the Commission for approval. The stipulation provided for a $20 million 
rate reduction effective September 1, 1988 and an additional $11 million reduction effective 
lzSince this argument and decision, and, in part, in response to it, the legislature amended Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-7-12(3) (Supp. 1989) to authorize the Commission to make interim decreases in rates as well as 
interim increases. The amendment provides that interim changes can be made only after an evidentiary 
hearing at which a prima facie showing is made justifying the change. Incidentally, the fact that the 
legislature amended the statute to allow interim decreases is an indication that the Commission does not 
have the authority to grant the refund Resellers seek; otherwise interim decreases would be unnecessary. 
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January 1, 1989. Resellers opposed the stipulation. On September 22, 1988, the 
Commission issued its order rejecting the stipulation and ordering Mountain Bell to reduce 
its rates on an interim basis by $16 million retroactively to August 1, 1988 and by a further 
$11 million on January 1, 1989. 
In order to avoid compliance with orders which it believed were unlawful, but at the 
same time to effect the rate reductions it had agreed to, Mountain Bell made a proposal 
to the Commission on September 27, 1988 to convene a settlement conference. It 
proposed voluntarily to reduce its rates on a permanent basis by $16 million effective 
September 22, 1988, and by a further $10 million effective January 1, 1989, if the Commis-
sion would vacate its orders of August 2, 1988 and September 22, 1988 and if the parties 
would agree that there would be no other permanent or interim rate decreases during the 
course of the rate case. The parties (including Resellers) agreed, and the Commission 
approved the settlement on October 3, 1988. A formal stipulation was signed, and the 
Commission issued its order on October 13, 1988 approving the stipulation and finding the 
rates as reduced September 22, 1988 just and reasonable. No party challenged or 
appealed that order. 
Following completion of several weeks of evidentiary hearings in 1989, the 
Commission issued its Report and Order on October 18, 1989, ordering a further rate 
reduction of $21.85 million which was made effective on November 15, 1989. In total, rate 
reductions from December 1987 through November 1989 amounted to $56.87 million. 
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6. Rates Charged in 1987 and 1988. During 1987 and 1988, Mountain Bell charged 
only rates found just and reasonable and approved by the Commission in final orders. The 
Commission did not enter any final order finding those rates unjust and unreasonable prior 
to the time they were charged. The Commission did not at anytime declare the rates 
collected by Mountain Bell as interim or subject to refund in any final order.13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In seeking a refund of rates previously approved by the Commission on the ground 
that those rates resulted in earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable by the 
Commission in the last general rate case, Resellers have asked the Commission to engage 
in a classic example of retroactive rate making. The reparations statute must be read 
consistently with the rate making statute, which forms the basis for the rule against 
retroactive rate making. So interpreted, the reparations statute does not permit a refund 
of rates collected which were found just and reasonable by the Commission and were 
collected prior to any finding by the Commission that they had become unjust and 
unreasonable. This appeal affords the Court the opportunity to reaffirm its strong and 
1
-
5On February 11, 1988, the Commission entered an order in Case No. 83-999-11, which is the 
proceeding on remand of Telecommunications Resellers of Utah v. Public Serv. Common, 747 P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1987), approving a stipulation of the parties, including Resellers, Mountain Bell and the Division, that 
the rates approved by the Commission in December 1987 would be interim as to Resellers until a final 
order was entered in that case. Subsequently, a further stipulation was entered into and approved by the 
Commission that the access rates paid by Resellers from December 22, 1987 would be interim and subject 
to refund based upon the access rates finally found just and reasonable by the Commission in the general 
rate case, PSCU Docket No. 88-049-07. The Commission's Report and Order of October 18, 1989 
constituted that order which was not appealed and is now final. If Resellers' argument that rates may be 
subject to refund if found unjust and unreasonable after the fact is correct, these stipulations would have 
been unnecessary. 
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clear precedent on these issues which gives appropriate finality to public utility rates and 
Commission rate orders. 
1. In reviewing the Order, the Court should grant deference to the Commission's 
conclusion that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making applied 
in this case because the issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court should also 
give considerable weight to the Commission's interpretation of the operative provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-20(1) because they are statutes the Commission is 
empowered to administer ("special laws"). This is particularly true here because the 
Commission relied upon and followed prior decisions of the Court interpreting those 
statutes. 
2. Resellers' claims that the Commission erred in not making findings or taking 
evidence of Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and that such conduct 
is a basis for an exception to the rule against retroactive rate making are barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). Resellers did not contend below that Mountain Bell's conduct 
needed to be investigated or that the Commission needed to take evidence on that 
conduct. More significantly, in their petitions for rehearing, Resellers did not contend that 
the Order was in error because the Commission's conclusion on exceptions to the rule 
against retroactive rate making was not supported by a finding on Mountain Bell's conduct 
or any evidence on such conduct or that the Commission was required to investigate 
Mountain Bell's conduct prior to making a decision on the Complaint. 
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3. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) as interpreted by Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) [the "EBA Case"! provides that all rate 
making must be prospective in nature. The rule against retroactive rate making is violated 
when rates are set or a surcharge or refund is ordered to allow a utility to recover past 
underearnings or to require it to disgorge past overearnings resulting from rates lawfully 
collected in the past. The rates collected by Mountain Bell in 1987 and 1988 were 
permanent rates found just and reasonable and approved by the Commission in final 
orders. In 1986, the rates resulted in underearnings. In 1987 and 1988, they resulted in 
earnings in excess of the rate of return on equity found reasonable by the Commission in 
the 1985 Rate Order. It would be no more proper to grant Resellers a refund of 
overearnings in 1987 and 1988 than to grant Mountain Bell a surcharge for underearnings 
in 1986. Section 54-4-4(1) and the rule against retroactive rate making bar the relief 
sought in the Complaint. 
4. The reparations statute, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20(1), properly interpreted and 
applied, is completely consistent with the prospective rate making mandated by section 
54-4-4(1) and the rule against retroactive rate making. As the Court stated in American 
Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987), the reparations statute does not 
authorize refunds of rates charged which have been found just and reasonable in final rate 
orders. Cases from other jurisdictions make clear that refunds of unjust and unreasonable 
rates are allowed where rates have been placed into effect without commission approval 
which are later determined to be unjust and unreasonable or where a utility continues to 
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collect rates found just and reasonable after a subsequent finding that the rates are unjust 
and unreasonable. Neither of these circumstances exists in this case; therefore, reparations 
are not authorized. 
5. Although the Court has not recognized any exceptions to the rule against 
retroactive rate making, the Commission concluded that certain exceptions might apply, but 
concluded that "none of these examples has been suggested in this case, nor any others 
that we would consider reasonable." (R. at 679-80 [Appendix 2]). This decision on a 
mixed question of law and fact is not only well within the tolerable limits of reason and 
rationality, it is consistent with the authorities cited by Resellers allowing exceptions to the 
rule. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW - THE COMMISSION'S DECISION ON A 
MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND INTERPRETATIONS 
OF SPECIAL LAWS ARE ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE. 
MCI argues that the Court should grant no deference to the Commission's 
conclusions in this case because they are based upon interpretations of general law. MCFs 
argument overlooks the fact that the Order was based upon a conclusion on a mixed 
question of law and fact and upon interpretations of the operative provisions of statutes 
the Commission is empowered to administer (known as special laws). 
The basis for the Commission's decision was its conclusion that it lacked authority 
to order a refund of rates collected pursuant to tariffs previously found just and reasonable 
and approved by the Commission. In rejecting Resellers' claim that the Complaint fell 
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under an exception to the rule against retroactive rate making, the Commission made a 
conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact. In relying on the EBA Case, the 
Commission accepted the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) adopted by the 
Court in that case: that the Commission is only entitled to change rates prospectively and 
that it does not have authority to make retroactive adjustments in rates based upon a 
utility's earnings. In rejecting Resellers' argument that the reparations statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-7-20(1), authorized the relief requested, the Commission accepted the 
interpretation of the statute in American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 
1987), that reparations cannot be granted of rates found just and reasonable in final 
orders. 
In reviewing decisions of the Commission on mixed questions of law and fact and 
interpreting special laws, the Court has been governed by the standards set forth in Utah 
Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983) 
["Wexpro IF], recently reaffirmed in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 754 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988). The Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. (1988)) has not affected these particular standards. See 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The appropriate standard of review on these issues is clearly stated in Wexpro II, 
Mountain States, and Pro-Benefit Staffing. When an administrative agency makes decisions 
on mixed questions of law and fact or interprets the operative provisions of statutes it is 
empowered to administer, the Court utilizes an intermediate standard of review. Under 
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this standard, the Court "uphold[s] the Commission's findings as long as they are not 
outside the 'tolerable limits of reason' and are not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously." 
Mountain States, 754 P.2d at 930 (citing Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 612). The Court also 
applies the "time honored rule of law . . . that the construction of statutes by governmental 
agencies charged with their administration should be given considerable weight." Wexpro 
II, 658 P.2d at 610 (quoting McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977)). 
Contrary to MCI's argument, the Court should give deference to the Commission's 
decision that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate making were 
applicable in this case and should give considerable weight to the Commission's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-20(1) and should give deference 
to the Commission's decision that none of the exceptions to the rule against retroactive 
rate making were applicable in this case. The Court should only overturn the 
Commission's decision if it is not within the tolerable limits of reason or if it was imposed 
arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Even if a no deference standard is applied in interpreting special laws as urged by 
MCI, the argument below establishes that the Commission's conclusions, including its 
application of the EBA Case to the facts here, are correct. 
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H. RESELLERS' CLAIMS THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED 
IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS OR TAKING EVIDENCE OF 
MOUNTAIN BELL'S CONDUCT AND ACTIONS ARE 
BARRED BY THEIR FAILURE TO RAISE THEM ON 
REHEARING. 
MCI claims that the Court must remand this matter to the Commission with 
instructions to investigate Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and 
determine whether Mountain Bell has waived the protection of the rule against retroactive 
rate making as a result of such conduct. (MCI Br. at 45, 50) Resellers also claim that 
the Commission's conclusion of law stating that "certain exceptions to the rule [against 
retroactive rate making] are reasonable; for example, where it could be demonstrated that 
the utility had misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled 
regulators, [but that] none of the examples have been suggested in this case" is not 
supported by its factual findings. (MCI Br. at 44; Tel-America Br. at 22) 
While these arguments may have superficial dramatic appeal, neither of the 
Resellers in their petitions for rehearing requested the Commission to conduct an 
investigation or hold a hearing to determine if utility misconduct had taken place; further, 
neither petition for rehearing challenged the Commission's conclusion of law cited above 
or claimed that it was not supported by findings of fact or evidence. (R. at 685-96 
[Appendices 3 and 4]) Resellers' make these arguments for the first time in their briefs 
on this appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. §54-7-15(2)(b), unequivocally provides that: 
No applicant may urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the 
application (for rehearing) in an appeal (of a Commission order) to any court. 
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The Court has held repeatedly that it has no jurisdiction to hear issues not raised 
before the Commission. High-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 
P.2d 682 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); Utah 
Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979). Accordingly, 
the Court cannot consider Resellers' arguments regarding lack of evidence or findings on 
Mountain Bell's conduct in the TRA-86 investigation and cannot reverse and remand for 
the purpose of conducting an investigation into that conduct.14 
DI. REQUIRING A REFUND OF RATES FOUND JUST AND 
REASONABLE IN FINAL RATE ORDERS CONSTITUTES 
PROHIBITED RETROACTIVE RATE MAKING. 
Resellers argue that the EBA Case, and the rule against retroactive rate making as 
stated in that case, do not prevent the Commission from granting reparations in this case. 
Their argument implies that the rule against retroactive rate making and the doctrine of 
reparations are totally independent of one another and inconsistent, and that reparations 
take precedence over the rule against retroactive rate making. A brief review of the rule 
against retroactive rate making and reparations demonstrates the flaws in this argument 
and establishes that there is no conflict between the doctrines when appropriately 
interpreted and applied. 
14Because Resellers did not preserve these issues, the cases they cite on utility misconduct Matter of 
Minn. Public Util. Comm'n, 417 N.W. 2d 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 130 (1988); 
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1980); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379 (Nev. 1970), are inapplicable. 
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The rule against retroactive rate making requires that the Commission only set rates 
prospectively to be thereafter in force. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1); EBA Case 720 P.2d 
at 420. The Commission may not set rates, order refunds or implement surcharges to 
make up for a utility's past overearnings or underearnings.15 Reparations, on the other 
hand, may be exacted from a utility in three circumstances: first, when a utility charges 
a rate in excess of its filed tariff; second, when a utility charges a rate that unreasonably 
discriminates between customers in similar circumstances; and third, when a utility charges 
a rate never legally approved by the Commission which is later found unjust and 
unreasonable or continues to charge a rate previously approved but which has been 
subsequently found unjust and unreasonable by the Commission. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-20(1). 
This point will discuss the rule against retroactive rate making in greater detail. 
Point IV will focus on reparations. 
l^The EBA Case specifically declares that a utility cannot be compensated in the future for past losses 
or forced to refund excess profits. 720 P.2d at 420-21. Further, it is generally accepted that the rule against 
retroactive rate making prevents a utility from being required to refund past excess profits when the utility 
has charged a rate approved by the Commission. See e^. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Common, 
320 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) affd 329 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. 1983). See also cases cited in note 18, infra. 
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A. The Governing Statute Clearly Provides that Rates Are To Be Set Prospectively. 
The Commission's authority to set rates (in the absence of a rate change proposed 
by a public utility) is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1).16 
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates . . . 
charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product . . . are 
unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in anywise in violation 
of any provisions of law, or that such rates . . . are insufficient, the 
commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates . . . to be 
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as 
hereinafter provided. [Emphasis added.] 
This section makes it clear that the Commission can only set rates prospectively. In Utah 
Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["Wage Case"], 
and the EBA Case, the Court reviewed how this statutory mandate for prospective rate 
making occurs in practice. 
In the Wage Case, Mountain Fuel sought a rate increase to offset general wage 
increases granted to employees shortly after the conclusion of a general rate case. The 
Court reversed a Commission order approving the rate increase. The Court said that: 
the basic approach in rate making is to take a test year and determine the 
revenues, expenses and investment for the test year. The test period results 
are adjusted to allow for reasonably anticipated changes in revenues, expenses, 
or other conditions in order that the test period results of operations will be 
as nearly representative of future conditions as possible. . . . [Citing City of 
Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 797 (Cal. 1972)] 
In a general rate proceeding the commission determines for a test period the 
expenses, the rate base, and the rate of return to be allowed. Based on those 
figures, the commission determines the revenue requirements, then fixes a rate 
16Rate changes may also be initiated by public utilities under Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3 (1986) and 
54-7-12 (Supp. 1989). Those sections, like section 54-4-4, provide that changes in rates must be prospective 
and are subject to refund or surcharge only if a rate change is granted on an interim basis pursuant to 
subsection 54-7-12(3). 
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to produce sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements. [Emphasis 
added.] 
614 P.2d at 1248. 
In the EBA Case, the Court considered whether the Commission could make an 
accounting adjustment that transferred funds from Utah Power & Light Company's 
("UP&L") energy balancing account ("EBA") to its general revenue account to make up 
for deterioration in its earnings. The Court held that the adjustment was not authorized 
because it amounted to a retroactive adjustment to rates. The Court then explained the 
appropriate application of prospective rate making when it turns out that earnings are 
higher or lower than was contemplated when rates were set: 
Some background discussion concerning utility rate making is necessary 
to a consideration of the issues presented. Following lengthy hearings, utility 
rates are fixed prospectively by the PSC. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-4-4(1), and § 
54-7-12(l)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974, Supp. 1985). In determining an 
appropriate rate, the PSC considers the utility's historical income and cost 
data, as well as predictions of future costs and revenues, and arrives at a rate 
which is projected as being adequate to cover costs and give the utility's 
shareholders a fair return on equity. [Citing the Wage Case.] To provide 
utilities with some incentive to operate efficiently, they are generally not 
permitted to adjust their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated 
costs or unrealized revenues. [Citing section 54-4-4.] This process places 
both the utility and the consumers at risk that the rate-making procedures 
have not accurately predicted costs and revenues. If the utility underestimates 
its costs or overestimates revenues, the utility makes less money. By the same 
token, if a utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below 
predictions, the utility keeps the excess. Overestimates and underestimates are 
then taken into account at the next general rate proceeding in an attempt to 
arrive at a just and reasonable future rate. [Emphasis added and citation 
omitted.] 
720 P.2d at 420-21. 
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It is hard to imagine how the Court could have made it any more clear that rate 
making is an inexact science in which a variety of factors are considered to set rates for 
the future. When it turns out that the rates set are too high or too low, which inevitably 
occurs because of errors in projection and changes in circumstance, the only remedy is to 
go through the process again.17 The Court, citing section 54-4-4(1), also said that the 
Commission's "broad authority to regulate a utility's business . . . must be construed to 
harmonize with the general rules for rate making set by the legislature, to wit: all rate 
making must be prospective in effect . . . ." Id. at 423. [Citation omitted and emphasis 
added.] Section 54-4-4(1) codifies and the EBA Case explicitly adopts the rule against 
retroactive rate making. 
The rule against retroactive rate making is not unique to Utah. In Public Util. 
Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co. , 317 U.S. 456, 464, reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943), 
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Ohio commission had authority 
retroactively to set rates for interstate sales of natural gas that occurred prior to the 
adoption of the Natural Gas Act. The Ohio statute, like section 54-4-4(1), provided that 
the Ohio commission could investigate a rate and, after hearing, find it unjust and 
unreasonable and fix a new rate "to be thereafter" collected. In reference to this language, 
the Court said: 
The statute in terms thus gives the Commission power to prescribe such rates 
prospectively only. If, after notice and hearing, the Commission finds rates 
to be unlawful, it can then fix the just and reasonable rates "to be thereafter" 
*'Note 3, supra, demonstrates that errors in projection and changes in circumstance have typcially 
resulted in Mountain Bell earning less than it is allowed to the benefit of rate payers during the last decade. 
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charged. The establishment of new rates must be preceded by a finding that 
the old rates are unjust and unreasonable, and the new rates are prospective 
as of the date they are fixed. There is no basis in the statute for concluding 
that the Commission's orders can be retroactive . . . ; on the contrary, the 
explicit language of the statute precludes such a construction. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The holding of United Fuel Gas Co. has been almost universally followed in 
interpreting ratemaking statutes that contain words such as "to be thereafter observed and 
in force."18 An overwhelming majority of states agree with the EBA Case, the Wage Case, 
and United Fuel Gas Co. and have adopted the rule against retroactive rate making.19 
15See e ^ Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1965); City of 
Miami v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm,n, 208 So.2d 249, 260 (Fla. 1968); Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 
527 A.2d 354, 359 (N.J. 1987); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607, 
619 (W.Va. 1982); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Common, 320 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), affd 
329 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Wis. 1983) 
iySee ejj., Pueblo Del Sol Water Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 772 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1988); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 576 P.2d 945, 946 (Cal. 1978); City of Los Angeles 
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 803-04 (Cal. 1972); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 
401 P.2d 353, 363-64 (Cal. 1965); Colo. Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Colo., 704 P.2d 
298, 305 (Colo. 1985); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Util. Control, 516 A2d 888, 896 (Conn. 
Super Ct. 1986); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 468 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Del. 1983); 
Westwood Lake, Inc. v. Dade County, 264 So.2d 7, 12 (Fla. 1972); Ga. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Atlanta Gas 
Light Co., 55 S.E.2d 618, 631 (Ga. 1949); Ind. Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 171 N.E.2d 111, 124 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1960); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 
1988); La. Power & Light Co. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 523 So.2d 850, 857 (La. 1988); Maine Public 
Advocate v. Public Util. Comm'n, 476 A.2d 178, 183 (Me. 1984); Metro. Dist. Comm'n v. Dept. of Public 
Util, 224 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Mass. 1967); General Motors Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n No. 2, 438 N.W.2d 
616, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Building Owners and Managers Ass'n of Metro Detroit v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 383 N.W.2d 72, 80 (Mich. 1986); Miss. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Home Tel. Co., 110 So.2d 618, 624 
(Miss. 1959); State ex rel. Util. Consumers Council of Mo., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41, 59 
(Mo. 1979); Mont. Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern R.R., 7 P.2d 919, 925 (Mont. 1932); Southwest 
Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 474 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1970); Montana Dakota Util. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n., 431 N.W.2d 276, 280 (N.D. 1988); In re Granite State Elec. Co., 421 A.2d 121, 122 (N.H. 1980); 
Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 359 (N.J. 1987); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. N. 
M. State Corp. Comm'n, 563 P.2d 588, 604 (N.M. 1977); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 232 S.E.2d 
184, 194-95 (N.C 1977); River Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 433 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ohio 1982); 
Parker v. S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n, 342 S.E. 2d 403, 405 (S.C. 1986); City of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power 
Co., 90 S.E.2d 140, 145 (Va. 1955); Tariff Filing of New England Tel & Tel. Co., 505 A.2d 680, 682 (Vt. 
1986); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607, 619 (W.Va. 1982); 
Friends of the Earth v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 254 N.W.2d 299, 309 (Wis. 1977); MGTC, Inc., v. Public Serv. 
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The Complaint would have required the Commission to find rates that it once found 
just and reasonable following a general rate case, unjust and unreasonable at some point 
in time in the past. Such relief is contrary to section 54-4-4(1). 
B. The Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making Is Consistent With Other Principles and 
Policies. 
Interpreting section 54-4-4(1) to require that ratemaking occur prospectively only 
is consistent with the legislative nature of rate making, is constitutionally based and is 
sound policy. 
1. Rate Making Is a Legislative Function and Can Only Operate Prospectively. 
Rates for certain transactions affected with the public interest were originally established 
by the legislature itself. Even though rate making has now been delegated to regulatory 
agencies, it is still recognized that the establishment of rates is a legislative function. 
In Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932), 
the United States Supreme Court said: 
The Commission's error arose from a failure to recognize that when it 
prescribed a maximum reasonable rate for the future it was performing a 
legislative function . . . . It could repeal the order as it affected future action, 
and substitute a new rule of conduct as often as occasion might require, but 
this was obviously the limit of its power, as of that of the legislature itself. 
284 U.S. at 389.20 
Common of Wyo., 735 P.2d 103, 107 (Wyo. 1987). 
20See ej*. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 266 (1908); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public 
Scrv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Administrative Serv. v. Public Services 
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 621 (Utah 1983) ["Wexpro II"]; Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. ComnTn, 
614 P.2d 1242, 1250 (Utah 1980) f"Wage Case"]; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
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For the Commission to have granted the relief Resellers seek, it would have had 
to alter the vested rights of parties based upon past facts. Such relief would be judicial 
in nature and contrary to the fundamental premise that rate making is a legislative act. 
The Commission acted properly in exercising its legislative ratemaking function by denying 
Resellers' request. 
2. The Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making Is Constitutionally Based.21 
Tel-America argues that the rule against retroactive rate making does not bar the relief 
sought in the Complaint because Mountain Bell had no vested right to earnings in excess 
of its authorized rate of return. This argument ignores the fact that the rule' against 
retroactive rate making as outlined in the EBA Case is not simply a common law 
prohibition, but is firmly grounded in state and federal constitutions. In Straube v. Bowling 
Green Gas Co., 227 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1950), the Missouri Supreme Court, citing 
Arizona Grocery, stated as follows: 
When the established rate of a utility has been followed, the amount so 
collected becomes the property of the utility, of which it cannot be deprived 
by either legislative or judicial action without violating the due process 
provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 
The Missouri court reaffirmed this decision in State ex rel. Util. Consumers Council of Mo. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979). See also, State ex rel. Boynton v. 
107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 187-88, reh'g denied, 107 Utah 530, 158 P.2d 935 (1945); Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. Public Seiv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, 546-53 (1944); Mulcahy v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298, 302 (1941). 
^The Commission and the Division take no position on this subpoint. 
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Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999, 1007 (Kan. 1932); State ex rel. Barvick v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In re Cent. Vt. Public Serv. Corp., 
473 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Vt. 1984). 
Mountain Bell was required to charge the rates on file with the Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 (1986). Furthermore, the Commission established 
that those rates were just and reasonable in final and non-appealed orders. Requiring 
Mountain Bell to refund amounts it lawfully collected pursuant to tariffs approved by the 
Commission would be violative of Mountain Bell's due process rights and constitute a 
confiscatory taking. 
3. The Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking Is Sound Policy. The prohibition 
against retroactive rate making is logical and sound. Without the rule, rates would never 
be final, and the ratemaking process would be confusing and disorderly. If retroactive rate 
making were allowed, both utility and customer would be subject to refunds or surcharges 
if rates charged were subsequently deemed too high or too low. Neither utility nor 
customer would have had notice that the price of a commodity or service was subject to 
change. See In re Cent. Vt. Public Serv. Corp., 473 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Vt. 1984). Thus, a 
customer, if subjected to a surcharge, would not have had an opportunity to adjust its 
consumption habits in response to higher rates. Likewise, a utility, if subjected to a refund, 
would not have had an opportunity to implement cost-cutting measures in response to 
lower rates. 
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Retroactive rate making frequently would not compensate or charge the appropriate 
customers. Customers are constantly being added and dropped by a utility. New 
customers should not be forced to pay a surcharge for services they did not receive, and 
they should not be permitted to obtain a refund for services for which they did not pay. 
See Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 361 (N.J. 1987). Likewise, 
customers who no longer receive service will not reap the benefit of a refund for services 
for which they have paid, or, would not be subject to a surcharge for services they 
purchased too cheaply. See State ex rel. Util. Common v. Edmisten, 232 S.E.2d 184, 194-
95 (N.C. 1977). 
Utility shareholders invest with an anticipation that they will receive a reasonable 
return on their investment. If a utility is subjected to a refund for earnings realized in 
prior years, investors will be much less likely to risk their capital in such an uncertain 
venture. In Ind. Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Common, 171 N.E.2d 111, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1960), the court said: 
We are satisfied that no utility could attract capital for expansion or 
replacement of its property and facilities, or for any other purpose, if the 
Commission could at one time fix rates for that utility and then at some later 
time rescind those rates retroactively, fix lower rates retroactively and require 
the difference to be refunded to ratepayers. The law . . . was not designed 
or intended to create chaotic conditions in the market where utilities, as well 
as other businesses go to obtain capital for their legitimate business purposes. 
In addition, a utility would never know if it could invest its earnings in capital 
improvements or pay dividends if its rates were subject to retroactive adjustment. See 
State ex rel. Standard Oil of Cal. v. Dep't of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936). 
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On the other hand, if a utility is allowed to make a retroactive surcharge for services many 
years down the road, shareholders who invest in the company in the future would receive 
a great windfall at the expense of shareholders in the past who underearned. Sound public 
policy and principles of finality demand adherence to the rule against retroactive rate 
making. 
C. Ordering a Refund of Earnings in Excess of the Rate of Return Found Reasonable 
By the Commission in the 1985 Rate Order Would Constitute Prohibited Retroactive 
Rate Making. 
Resellers argue that the rate of return utilized in setting rates is a limit which is not 
guaranteed, but which cannot be exceeded. Based upon this premise, they say that 
Mountain Bell's earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate 
Order were a violation of that order and that ordering a refund of excess earnings would 
simply amount to enforcement of the 1985 Rate Order. (MCI Br. at 46-49; Tel-America 
Br. at 11-12, 14-16). These arguments are contrary to Utah law, to accepted principles of 
rate making and to overwhelming precedent from other jurisdictions. 
1. Utah Authorities Are Directly Contrary to Resellers' Argument. A review of 
ratemaking statutes reveals that the Commission is empowered to set rates, not rate of 
return. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3, 54-3-7, 54-4-4, and 54-7-12.22 
zzThere is only one reference to "rate of return" in Title 54 of the Utah Code. That reference is in 
subsection 54-4a-6(4)(a) which establishes criteria to guide the work of the Division in acting in the public 
interest to advocate that utilities' rates be just, reasonable, and adequate. 
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In the Wage Case, 614 P.2d at 1248, the Court confirmed that rate of return is 
merely one component the Commission utilizes in setting rates: 
In a general rate proceeding, the commission determines for a test period 
the expenses, the rate base, and the rate of return to be allowed. Based on 
those figures, the commission determines the revenue requirements, then fixes 
a rate to produce sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements. 
Just as it would be improper to order a refund or surcharge in the event a utility's 
expenses change from those anticipated in a general rate case, it is improper to order a 
refund if earnings differ from those anticipated in setting rates. 
If the Wage Case left any doubt on the issue, in the EBA Case, the Court stated 
in reference to rate making that: 
This process places both the utility and the consumers at risk that the rate-making 
procedures have not accurately predicted costs and revenues. If the utility 
underestimates its costs or overestimates revenues, the utility makes less money. 
By the same token, if a utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below 
predictions, the utility keeps the excess. [Emphasis added.] 
720 P.2d at 420. If revenues exceed, or expenses are below, projections utilized in setting 
rates, the utility will earn in excess of the rate of return utilized in setting rates. The 
Court acknowledged that a utility would be entitled to keep the excess in such a 
circumstance. 
2. Learned Treatises Support the Utah Authorities. Resellers have attempted to 
analogize the rate of return utilized by the Commission in setting rates to a fishing limit: 
a utility is guaranteed no level of earnings but is only permitted to earn up to a specific 
amount established by the Commission. Resellers cite Priest, Principles of Public Utility 
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Regulation 202 (1969) and Welch, Cases and Text on Public Utility Regulation 478 (Rev. 
Ed. 1968), and cases citing Priest and Welch, for this proposition. A closer reading of 
these treatises indicates that Resellers have missed the point. Priest and Welch are 
making the point that "utility revenues are not guaranteed," not that the rate of return sets 
a limit which, if exceeded, requires a refund. Priest at 202-03. Welch makes this clear 
when he says that M[i]t is generally well settled that a failure of a utility to earn a sufficient 
return in the past cannot be made the basis for giving it an extra return above a fair 
allowance for the present and future, anymore than the present or future return can be 
cut down to offset excessive earnings in the past." Welch at 501. 
The leading treatise, J. Bonbright, A. Danielsen and D. Kamerschen, Principles of 
Public Utility Rates, 201 (1988), states: 
The tariff or rate schedule approved by the Commission is designed to yield 
a reasonable rate of return on average, over the next few years. But the 
revenue requirement may be missed on either side. The rate schedule, but 
not the total revenue level, is fixed. A firm that realizes a return that is 
above or below the permitted rate is not required to return the excess or be 
subsidized for the deficiency. 
3. Applicable Authorities from Other States Support the Utah Cases. Resellers 
cite only one case from another state, Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 (R.I. 
1986), supporting their argument that a utility may be required to refund earnings in excess 
of a rate of return utilized in setting rates. The overwhelming weight of the authority is 
to the contrary. A recent case from New Jersey typifies the approach of almost all courts. 
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In Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354 (N.J. 1987), the utility applied 
for a rate increase. At the hearing on the application, it was established that the company 
had charged rates that were previously set and approved in a final order of the Board of 
Public Utilities ("BPU"), but that, as a result of unforeseen factors beyond the control of 
the utility, it had experienced earnings in excess of its rate of return utilized in setting rates 
in the prior case. The BPU granted the rate increase, but delayed its effectiveness until 
the overearnings had been offset. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the effect of the order deferring the rate 
increase found just and reasonable "until an amount equal to the prior overearnings had 
been offset had precisely the same effect as granting an immediate increase and ordering 
the company to refund [the excess earnings] to ratepayers." Id. at 358. The court 
determined that the Commission only had statutory authority to set rates to be observed 
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"thereafter" and that utility rates are accorded prospective effect only. Id at 359.23 The 
New Jersey court held: 
Based upon the statutory language, the statutory ratemaking scheme, 
the Legislature's very limited and specific authorization to the BPU to engage 
in retroactive ratemaking, and our prior decisions, we hold that retroactive 
ratemaking is prohibited regardless of whether such ratemaking benefits the 
utility or the ratepayer. When existing rates are insufficient to provide a fair 
rate of return, the proper remedy for the utility is to file an application for 
higher rates. If, through unforeseen circumstances, a utility earns profits that 
are deemed excessive, the proper remedy is for the BPU to initiate a 
proceeding to lower the rates prospectively. [Citation omitted and emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 364. 
The facts of Elizabethtown Water Co. are strikingly similar to this case. Resellers 
allege that, as a result of unforeseen factors outside of its control, Mountain Bell, like 
Elizabethtown, has realized earnings in excess of the rate of return used by the 
z>The court noted that the New Jersey legislature granted specific authority to the Commission to 
order refunds under certain circumstances, but that generally refunds were not permitted. This argument 
applies with equal force in Utah. In four instances, the Utah legislature has provided specific mechanisms 
for refunds or reparations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-6-24(5) (1986), 54-7-12(3), and 54-7-20. Subsection 
54-6-24(5), which is applicable only to motor carriers, allows the Commission to refund overcharges to or 
collect undercharges from shippers in certain circumstances. Subsection 54-7-12(3) provides for interim rate 
changes during the course of a rate case and allows the Commission, if it ultimately approves rates different 
than the changed rates, to order a refund or surcharge of the excess of the interim change. Section 54-7-17 
provides for a refund of rates set by the Commission which are subsequently overturned by the Supreme 
Court on appeal under certain circumstances. Section 54-7-20 provides for reparations when a utility 
charges rates that differ from its approved tariffs. This section will be discussed more fully in Point IV, 
infra. None of these statutes is applicable here. 
The fact that the cited statutes contain specific language dealing with refunds, while Section 54-4-4(1) 
does not, is significant in determining legislative intent. It is a well recognized maxim that "where a statute 
with respect to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
concerning a related subject is significant in showing that a different intention existed." See State v. Welkos, 
109 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Wis. 1961). See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 
217 (1973). Accordingly, it can be presumed that the legislature intended the Commission to have authority 
to order refunds only in the specific circumstances provided. 
35 
Commission to set the rates which it charged. Resellers also requested the Commission 
to order Mountain Bell to disgorge all overearnings. In both states, the basic ratemaking 
statute provides that rates are set after hearing to be "thereafter" in effect. 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, West Virginia and Wisconsin have 
considered possible refunds of overearnings under statutory schemes similar to Utah's and 
have reached the same result as New Jersey.24 
In Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 (R.I. 1986), the only court 
decision cited by Resellers,25 the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld an order requiring 
a refund of earnings in excess of the "allowed" rate of return. Id. at 1148. 
Z4There are many cases holding that ordering a refund of earnings in excess of the rate of retun used 
in setting rates would violate the rule against retroactive rate making. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public 
Util. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1965) (the commission lacked power to order refunds on amounts 
collected by the utility pursuant to the rates previously approved by the commission); Conn. Light & Power 
Co. v. Dep't of Public Util. Control, 516 A.2d 888 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1986) (holding that the department could 
not require a deposit in a reserve account of earnings in excess of 15.9 percent to be used as an offset to 
next general rate request); City of Miami v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm'n, 208 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1968) (the public 
service commission did not have the power to rule public utility rate reductions retroactive and order 
refunds); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mich. Public Serv. Comm'n, 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946) (the public service 
commission did not have the power to reduce rates retroactively and order refunds); Chesapeake and 
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1982) (holding that a retroactive 
disallowance from a telephone company's rate base of excess profits earned by an affiliated manufacturer on 
sales to the company for periods which had previously been approved constituted a misapplication of legal 
principles in that the rate base only could be adjusted prospectively); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), affd 329 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. 1983) (holding that alleged 
overearnings by a utility could not be disgorged retroactively inasmuch as the utility had only collected what 
had been properly authorized by the Wisconsin commission). 
z:>MCI cites the Rhode Island Commission below in the Narragansett case. Re Narragansett Elec. 
Co., 57 PUR 4th 549 (RI. Public Util. Comm'n 1984). MCI also cites another commission decision, Re So. 
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 PUR 4th 49 (Fla. P.S.C. 1978). In that case, the Florida commission commenced 
an investigation into the revenue requirements of Southern Bell and determined that it was earning in excess 
of the rate of return utilized in setting its rates. Instead of having a rate case to lower rates prospectively, 
Southern Bell voluntarily agreed to make a refund to its customers. The case does not discuss the legal 
basis for this action and cannot serve as authority for an exception to the rule against retroactive rate 
making; the utility offered the refund voluntarily. 
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Important distinctions exist between the Rhode Island situation and that presented 
here. First, the Rhode Island statute is materially different from section 54-4-4(1). It does 
not have a provision stating that rates will be "thereafter" in force.26 The significance of 
the absence of the word "thereafter" is apparent from the cases cited in Point III, A, supra. 
Section 54-4-4(1) contains the word "thereafter" and, therefore, specifically provides that 
rates are to be set prospectively. Second, Rhode Island's refund statute was amended to 
make it more liberal immediately following a court decision which held that the 
commission did not have authority to order refunds.27 Third, Rhode Island is a national 
anomaly in recognizing a wide variety of exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate 
making.28 The Court has recognized no exceptions. 
In summary, although Rhode Island allows refunds of past overearnings based upon 
a different statutory scheme and a unique view of the rule against retroactive rate making, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia and Wisconsin have 
26The Rhode Island statute, R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-3-11 (Supp. 1988), provides in relevant part that: 
Within ninety (90) days after the completion of any such hearing, the commission shall 
make such order in reference to any proposed rate, toll or charge as may be proper. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the commission shall periodically hold a 
public hearing and make investigation as to the propriety of rates when charged by any 
public utility and shall make such order in reference to such rate, toll, or charge as may be 
just. 
27R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-3-13.1 (1984). This refund provision was amended after the court held in 
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 404 A.2d 821, 827 (R.I. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980), that a 
commission order finding a rate reasonable for the future has the effect of a statute and the revenues 
collected pursuant to the rate were not subject to refund. 
28See Point V, infra. 
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prohibited such refunds under statutes and rules against retroactive rate making similar to 
Utah's. 
IV. THE COMMISSION CANNOT ORDER REPARATIONS OF RATES 
FOUND JUST AND REASONABLE IN FINAL RATE ORDERS WHERE 
THE RATES WERE COLLECTED PRIOR TO ANY FINDING THAT 
THEY HAD BECOME UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE. 
The principal argument advanced by Resellers is that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 
allows the Commission to award refunds of rates collected which were previously found 
just and reasonable if they are now determined to be unjust and unreasonable in spite of 
the rule against retroactive rate making. In making this argument, Resellers make three 
crucial mistakes. First, they have incorrectly distinguished the recent ruling of the Court 
in American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987). Second, they have 
incorrectly assumed, contrary to all authority, that rates previously found just and 
reasonable by the Commission automatically become unjust and unreasonable if they result 
in earnings in excess of the rate of return used in setting them. Third, their interpretation 
of section 54-7-20(1) is inconsistent with, and nullifies, a portion of section 54-4-4(1). 
A. The Reparations Statute Applies Only When a Utility Charges a Rate that Has Not 
Been Approved in a Final Commission Order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20(1) (1986) provides in pertinent part: 
When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any 
rate . . . for any product or commodity furnished or service performed by any 
public utility, and the commission has found, after investigation, that the 
public utility has charged an amount for such product, commodity or service 
in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the commission, or 
has charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory amount against the 
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complainant, the commission may order that the public utility make due 
reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from the date of 
collection. 
Resellers do not claim that Mountain Bell has charged excess or discriminatory rates. 
They claim the statute is applicable because the rates charged were unjust and 
unreasonable. 
In a recent opinion, the Court defined the breadth of the reparations statute as 
applied to rates claimed to be unjust and unreasonable. In American Salt, Hatch agreed 
to haul salt for an amount less than the applicable tariff on file with, and previously 
approved by, the Commission. However, no approval was sought for this deviation from 
the tariff. A dispute developed between Hatch and American Salt which resulted in Hatch 
attempting to collect the filed tariff amount for the services provided. American Salt filed 
a complaint with the Commission claiming that the tariff was unjust and unreasonable 
because (1) it would result in Hatch earning a windfall profit, (2) application of the filed 
tariff did not make economic sense because it was higher than the retail value of the salt 
and three to four times the amount agreed upon and (3) the Commission had found a 
lower rate just and reasonable in approving a special rate for Morton Salt. Id. at 1062, 
1064. The Commission dismissed the complaint on the ground that, absent prior 
Commission approval, Hatch was required to charge the rate previously found just and 
reasonable. 
On appeal, the Court reviewed the requirement that rates charged must be just and 
reasonable. It noted that the rate Hatch sought to collect had been previously found just 
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and reasonable by the Commission. Id at 1063. Quoting from the EBA Case, the Court 
stated that "'all rate making must be prospective in effect' in order to protect the balance 
of risk between utilities and consumers." Id.29 The Court went on to quote with approval 
the Commission's order on rehearing, agreeing that the imposition of the higher filed rates 
was extremely harsh to American Salt. However, notwithstanding the apparent inequity, 
the Court said that "ftjhe tariff rates must be charged and collected unless prior specific 
authorization from [the] Commission is obtained." Id. at 1064. [Emphasis in original.] 
The Court concluded its analysis of American Salt's claim that it was entitled to 
reparations because Hatch's rates were unjust and unreasonable, stating: 
In this case, the general commodity tariff was the only tariff on file 
which could properly be applied to the shipments in question. The 
Commission could not order reparations under the statute. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 1065. 
MCI attempts to distinguish American Salt by arguing that in that case "the 
Commission had made a specific finding that the salt tariff was fair and reasonable" and 
the party seeking reparation "failed to contest that finding." (MCI Br. at 28-29) This 
argument is based on an incorrect reading of the case. In American Salt, the Court makes 
reference to a Commission finding that "[t]he Commission has found the salt tariff to be 
just and reasonable." The Court went on to explain that American Salt did not contest 
that finding. Id. at 1062. MCI interprets this language to imply that the Commission 
™The Court had no trouble reconciling the rule against retroactive rate making and the reparations 
statute in American Salt. Just as the Commission relied on the EBA Case in determining that reparation 
was not available in this case, the Court relied on the EBA Case in determining that reparation was not 
available in American Salt. See, Point IV. C, infra. 
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made a finding in the case before it on American Salt's reparations complaint that the salt 
tariff was just and reasonable. That is not correct. The Commission found that it had 
previously found the salt tariff just and reasonable. See Commission Report and Order 
attached hereto as Appendix 13 at 3 paragraph 4. MCI also interprets the Court's 
language to imply that American Salt did not preserve its claim that the rate was unjust 
and unreasonable. Again, this interpretation is incorrect. American Salt alleged that the 
rate was unjust and unreasonable in its petition for rehearing and in its appeal. See 
American Salt's Application for Rehearing attached as Appendix 14 at 11-12, 16-21; 
American Salt's Docketing Statement attached as Appendix 15 at 6. 
The same thing happened in this case. In the 1985 Rate Order, the Commission 
found that the rates charged by Mountain Bell were just and reasonable. Like American 
Salt, Resellers could not challenge in a subsequent case the Commission's prior finding 
that the rates charged were just and reasonable; the finding was an accomplished fact of 
which the Commission and the Court could take notice. 
B. Rates Approved by the Commission in Final General Rate Case Orders Are by 
Definition Just and Reasonable and, Therefore, Not Subject to Reparations. 
Resellers argument that a refund is justified under section 54-7-20 rests on the 
premise that the rates charged by Mountain Bell during 1987 and 1988 were unjust and 
unreasonable. Resellers assume, without citing any authority, that, if rates charged result 
in earnings in excess of the rate of return found reasonable by the Commission, they are 
unjust and unreasonable. (MCI Br. at 13; Tel-America Br. at 8) This argument ignores 
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the principle that American Salt found persuasive: that public utilities are obligated under 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 to charge the rates approved and on file with the Commission. 
It would be absurd for the law to require a public utility to charge rates approved by the 
Commission and at the same time subject it to reparations for charging those rates. 
Resellers' argument also ignores overwhelming authority from throughout the country 
that rates approved by a regulatory commission in a final order are just and reasonable 
until subsequently found otherwise after hearing. For example, in Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Mich. Public Serv. Comm'n, 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946), the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that: 
[W]hen a regulatory body has prescribed a rate to be charged for the future 
by a public utility and subsequently decides that such prescribed rate should 
be reduced, it cannot penalize the utility for collecting the rate during the 
period elapsing between the date of the order prescribing the rate and the 
date of the subsequent order reducing it. 
Id. at 204. 
As applied to reparations statutes, this principle means that reparations cannot be 
awarded for a rate charged in conformity with a final rate order. The leading case is 
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 390 (1932), in which 
the Supreme Court of the United States stated the established and frequently cited rule 
against retroactive rate making: 
Where the Commission has upon complaint, and after hearing, 
declared what is the maximum reasonable rate to be charged by a carrier, it 
may not at a later time, and upon the same or additional evidence as to the 
fact situation existing when its previous order was promulgated, by declaring 
its own finding as to reasonableness erroneous, subject a carrier which 
conformed thereto to the payment of reparation measured by what the 
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Commission now holds it should have decided in the earlier proceeding to 
be a reasonable rate. 
Arizona Grocery disposes of Resellers' argument that the reparations statute exists 
independently of the rule against retroactive rate making. It is a case in which a claim for 
reparations was found untenable because it violated the rule against retroactive rate 
making. 
In State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), the 
Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting the words "unjust and unreasonable" under its 
reparations statute, reached a similar holding.30 The court stated: 
it seems clear that when a rate has been the subject of a deliberate inquiry 
in which the carriers, the shippers, and the commission's own experts have 
participated, as well as any and all other persons who cared to take a hand 
in it as the statute provides and permits, any rate so prescribed by the 
commission and put into effect by the carriers may be confidently collected 
and retained by them as their very own, without misgiving that at some future 
time a further hearing of the commission may be had and more evidence 
taken and a different conclusion reached and those rates condemned as 
unreasonable and reparation certificates allowed for the difference between 
the rates which the commission did authorize and the rates which it should 
have authorized. Such a method of regulating public utilities has none of the 
earmarks of due process of law nor of the simplest notions of justice. Nor 
would it be worth the while of any shipper to receive such a reparation 
certificate, for it would not serve as a justiciable basis of recovery. That point, 
at least, was laid at rest by [Arizona Grocery]. [Citations omitted.] 
Kansas statute, Kan. Stat. Ann, § 66-154a-1 (1929), paralleled Section 54-7-20 in many ways. 
11 provided in relevant part thai: 
upon complaint in writing made to the public service commission that an unfair, unjust, 
unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential rate or charge has been 
exacted, such commission shall investigate said complaint, and if substantial, shall make a 
certificate under its seal setting forth what is, and what would have been a reasonable and 
just rate or charge for the service rendered, which shall be prima facie evidence of the matter 
therein stated. 
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Id. at 1006-07.31 
The law in other jurisdictions comports with that in Utah and supports the sound 
rule that rates set by a commission in a final general rate case order are by definition "just 
and reasonable" and, therefore, not subject to reparations. 
C. Reparation of Unjust and Unreasonable Rates Is Allowed Only When a Utility 
Continues to Charge Rates Previously Approved After Those Rates Have Been 
Later Found Unjust and Unreasonable or Charges Rates Never Approved. 
Resellers argue that the words "unjust" and "unreasonable" in section 54-7-20 must 
apply to a circumstance such as the present one or they could have no application and 
would be effectively read out of the statute. In so arguing, they have ignored several cases 
which explain the proper application of the terms "unjust" and "unreasonable" in awarding 
reparations. Their argument also creates a conflict between sections 54-4-4(1) and 
54-7-20(1) contrary to rules of statutory construction. 
1. Reparation of Unjust and Unreasonable Rates Is Permitted in Appropriate 
Circumstances. In the leading case, Cheltenham & Abington Sewage Co. v. Pa. Public 
Util. Comm'n, 25 A.2d 334, (Pa.) cert, denied, 317 U.S. 588 (1942), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court considered whether a reparation award was appropriate where a utility had 
earned in excess of a gross revenue figure established by the Pennsylvania commission. 
In 1930, the commission determined the utility's revenue requirement and ordered it to file 
^Many other cases state that rates established by a commission are presumed just and reasonable. 
See e.g. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 591 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1979); City of Moorhead v. 
Minn. Public Util. Comm'n, 343 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. 1984); State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 
224 P.2d 155, 166 (N.M. 1950); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 200 P. 232, 233 (Okla. 1921); State 
ex rel. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Dept. of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936). 
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a tariff to produce that level of revenue. The utility filed a tariff which was approved by 
the commission to be effective on July 1, 1931. Two and one-half years later, the 
commission instituted an investigation into the reasonableness of the utility's rates. On 
August 30, 1935, after hearing, the commission issued an order finding that the rates that 
had been in effect since 1931 were unjust and unreasonable. The commission also found 
a new lower revenue requirement to be just and reasonable. The utility appealed. During 
the pendency of the appeal, the utility continued to charge the old rates until January 1, 
1937 when it established new rates consistent with the commission's order as modified by 
the lower court on appeal. 
A petition was filed with the commission on October 17, 1935 seeking reparations 
with respect to a particular rate because, when the rate had been set in 1930, the 
commission noted some uncertainty regarding the level of income that should be produced 
by the rate and noted that a rate adjustment might be necessary to ensure that the income 
level was appropriate. In 1934, it was determined that the rate had produced too much 
income. Id. at 338. The commission awarded reparation of the excess from October 17, 
1933. It selected that date because it was two years prior to the date the complaint was 
filed and two years was the period prescribed by the statute for reparation of unjust and 
unreasonable rates. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court noted the importance of 
placing the utility on notice that its rates would be collected subject to reparations stating: 
The rates prescribed by the commission in 1931 after hearing were 
"commission-made" rates as that term is used in utility law. . . . The company 
consequently was entitled to rely upon the declaration of the commission as 
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to what was a lawful and reasonable rate until a change was made by the 
commission acting in its quasi legislative capacity. 
There were important distinctions between proceedings to fix future 
rates . . . and those for reparations . . . . "The object of a rate proceeding 
is to prevent a public wrong for the future; reparation redresses a private 
wrong of the past. . . . By the express provisions of the statute nothing can 
be done toward the redressing of the wrongs suffered through the exaction 
of unreasonable rates until the commission, after hearing, 'shall determine 
that any rates which have been collected * * * were * * * unreasonable' 
. . . ." [Citations omitted.] Nevertheless a commission-made rate furnishes 
the applicable law for the utility and its customers until a change is made by 
the commission. The utility was entitled to rely on the order of 1931 until 
August 30, 1935, but thereafter might be liable for reparations. 
When the commission on August 30, 1935, determined that the rates 
were unjust and unreasonable, that constituted a new enactment fixing the 
relative rights of the utility and its customers. 
Id. at 336-38. 
Cheltenham provides one answer to Resellers' question regarding the applicability 
of the words "unjust" and "unreasonable" in section 54-7-20. A rate may be unjust and 
unreasonable on a prospective basis if it has been approved previously by the commission 
in a final order but has later been found, after hearing, to be unjust and unreasonable. 
In such a case, reparations may be awarded only from the date of the new order 
establishing that the rate is unjust and unreasonable. 
Here, there was never a finding in a final order that the rates charged by Mountain 
Bell were unjust and unreasonable until the Commission implicitly made that finding in its 
orders setting new rates. Mountain Bell did not charge the rates implicitly found unjust 
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and unreasonable after such orders, but charged the new rates approved by the 
Commission. Therefore, no reparations can be awarded in this case. 
State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), also 
identified another circumstance under which unjust and unreasonable rates are subject to 
reparation. Boynton holds that reparation may be allowed where rates are filed by a 
utility but are not specifically approved by the regulatory body and are later found to have 
been unreasonable. However, Boynton must be read with State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal. v. Dep't of Public Works, 53 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1936), in which the court held 
that reparations of rates not previously approved and later found unreasonable cannot 
reach rates collected prior to the date of filing the complaint. The court stated: 
Without further analysis, we think that the statute law, when read and 
considered as a whole, leads to the view, and we must now hold, that when 
a rate is filed, published and permitted to become effective by the department, 
it is and remains, until challenged in the manner provided by statute, the 
lawful rate and the only lawful rate to be charged and collected. Otherwise, 
the carrier would never know what its lawful earnings were and could never 
allocate its earnings to betterments and dividends without the possibility of 
being embarrassed by delayed orders to make restitution. It cannot be the 
legislative intent that its only protection in that respect is the two year 
limitation contained in the statute. Therefore, when a scheduled rate is 
challenged, that challenge should affect the scheduled rate only from the date 
of the filing of the complaint. 
Id. at 319. 
2. Allowing Reparations in this Case Conflicts with Section 54-4-4(1). It is well 
established that a statute must be construed "so as to make it harmonious with other 
statutes relevant to the subject matter." Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 
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1980). In In re Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P.2d 929 (1968), the 
Court had to interpret two statutes that appeared somewhat contradictory on their faces. 
The Court set a framework for interpreting statutes stating: 
They should be looked at together, in their relationship to each other, with 
a view to reconciling any such apparent conflict and giving each its intended 
effect insofar as that can be accomplished without nullifying the other. It is 
therefore appropriate to consider the purpose of each statute and what would 
be the result of the alternative interpretations contended for by the parties. 
Id. at 931-32. 
The Commission's interpretation of the reparations statute, section 54-7-20, is the 
only reasonable interpretation when that statute is read together with the ratemaking 
statute, section 54-4-4. Resellers' interpretation fails to read the statutes together and 
effectively reads the words "to be thereafter observed and in force" out of section 
54-4-4(1). Under their view, every rate would be subject to retroactive adjustment if later 
found unjust and unreasonable.32 
V. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT NONE OF THE 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATE 
MAKING APPLY IN THIS CASE IS WITHIN THE TOLERABLE LIMITS 
OF REASON. 
JZTel-America makes two arguments that deserve only passing reference. First, Tel-America cites 
Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. ComnrTn, 681 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that 
reparations are appropriate when rates are made unreasonable by later increases in utility revenues. (Tel-
America Br. at 19) This misstates the holding of Garkane and its relationship to the reparations statute. 
Garkane simply stands for the proposition that if a utility charges amounts in excess of its rate schedule, 
the excessive charges may be subject to reparation. It does not address the issue presented in this case. 
Second, Tel-America claims that the doctrine of unjust enrichment would require that earnings in excess of 
the rate of return found reasonable in the 1985 Rate Order be refunded in this case. (Tel-America Br. at 
23-24) This argument ignores precedent that the common law right to restitution has been subsumed in 
reparations or stay pending appeal statutes. See Independent Voters of 111, v. 111. Commerce Comm'n, 510 
N.E.2d 850 (111. 1987); Spintman v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., of Md., 255 A-2d 304 (Md. 1969). 
Utah has both types of statutes which more than adequately protect rate payers in appropriate circumstances. 
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Resellers have cited a variety of exceptions to the rule against retroactive rate 
making and contend that the Commission erred in failing to find one of them applicable. 
(MCI Br. at 36-45; Tel-America Br. at 13-16) The Commission considered these 
exceptions and concluded that certain exceptions might apply including where the utility 
had "misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled regulators, or 
where a prior rate has been nullified as a result of a Supreme Court order, or possibly 
other situations could be suggested." However, based upon the undisputed facts, the 
Commission concluded that "none of these examples has been suggested in this case, nor 
any others that we would consider reasonable." (R. at 679-80 [Appendix 2]) This 
conclusion by the Commission involving a mixed question of law and fact is within the 
tolerable limits of reason and should not be overturned. 
A. The Exceptions to the Rule Against Retroactive Rate Making for Unforeseen Events 
Are Not Applicable. 
Resellers attempt to analogize this case to cases finding exceptions to the rule 
against retroactive rate making where unforeseeable events outside the control of the utility 
occur. (MCI Br. at 36-39; Tel-America Br. at 13) There are two problems with Resellers' 
argument. First, TRA-86 is not such an event. Second, the Commission and Division 
foresaw the potential impact of TRA-86 and acted responsibly in attempting to deal with 
it. 
A handful of jurisdictions have allowed exceptions to the rule against retroactive 
rate making in response to severe storms or other unique problems. These exceptions 
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have involved situations in which the financial viability of the utility or utility service is 
severely impacted by an unforeseen event which occurs before the utility and regulators 
have an opportunity to investigate and make appropriate prospective rate changes.33 
TRA-86 is not similar in any way to these unforeseen events. Although TRA-86 
was unforeseen in the 1985 test year, it was not unforeseen before it occurred, and it did 
not occur before the utility and regulators had an opportunity to adjust rates prospectively 
to deal with it. There was a tremendous national debate on tax reform prior to enactment 
of TRA-86. The Act became law on October 22, 1986. The only provisions of the Act 
effective retroactively prior to that date repealed investment tax credits and diminished 
Mountain Bell's earnings. The provision which Resellers cite as resulting in an unforeseen 
windfall to Mountain Bell, the reduction in corporate tax rate, was not effective for more 
than eight months after TRA-86 became law. 
The fact that TRA-86 was foreseeable is demonstrated by MCFs argument that 
many states took action to ensure that the benefits from it inured to rate payers. 
However, contrary to MCFs assertion that, M[w]hile the Utah Commission and Division 
were waiting for Mountain Bell to produce the earnings and budget data to demonstrate 
the financial impact of the 86 Tax Act, other states and utilities were acting in 
overwhelming numbers to reverse the benefits of tax cuts for utility rate payers" (MCI Br. 
JJSee Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1988); 
State ex rel. Pittman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 520 So.2d 1355 (Miss. 1987); Blackstone Valley Elec. Co. v. 
Public Util. Comm'n, 542 A.2d 242 (R.L 1988); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 1379 (R.I. 1984); 
Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1984); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177 (R.I. 
1980); Petition of Green Mountain Power Corp., 519 A.2d 595 (Vt. 1986); Wisconsin's Environ. Decade, Inc. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 298 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
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at 22), the Commission and Division took prompt action to investigate the effects of the 
Act on earnings and took appropriate action based upon the information received. It 
makes no sense to claim that TRA-86 was an unforeseen event under these circumstances. 
Resellers' real objection is not that TRA-86 was unforeseen or that Utah regulators 
did not respond to it, but that Resellers are not satisifed with the Utah response. This 
objection is incorrect because it ignores the circumstances in 1986 and 1987 including the 
fact that information then available did not indicate that overearnings would occur, that 
the Wage Case discouraged single issue rate cases, and that section 54-7-12(3), as it then 
existed, did not authorize the Commission to order interim rate reductions. Based upon 
these facts, the Commission found that the Division acted in good faith (R. 679 [Appendix 
2]) However, even if this finding is ignored and Resellers' objection is assumed to be 
valid, this would only indicate that there was some mistake in the regulatory process. A 
similar claim was considered by the Court in the EBA Case and rejected. In the EBA 
Case, UP&L contended that, if the Commission was barred from transferring funds from 
the EBA to the general revenues of the company, the EBA should be found to be an 
invalid mechanism because it improperly included revenues and expenses that it should not 
have. The Court rejected that argument, stating unequivocally: 
In determining the validity of the order here under review, the fact that the 
PSCs motive was to correct some untoward effects of a faultily constructed 
EBA would be irrelevant The bar on retroactive rate making has no 
exception for missteps made in the rate-making process. Corrective action 
can be taken, but it must be prospective only. [Emphasis added.] 
720 P.2d at 424. 
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B. MCFs Reliance on Fuel Cost Pass-Through Cases and Similar Cases Is Misplaced. 
In an effort to overcome the obvious bar of the rule against retroactive rate making 
to the Complaint, MCI has cited numerous cases allowing refunds of rates established 
pursuant to fuel adjustment or other flow-through mechanisms. The premise of this 
argument is that ordering a refund is not rate making. (MCI Br. at 34-35) This premise 
is incorrect. See Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 527 A.2d 354, 358 (N.J. 1987); 
Spintman v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 255 A.2d 304, 307 (Md. 1969). In 
any event, a quick review of MO's cases demonstrates that they are not applicable to the 
facts of this case and that they are not inconsistent with the general prohibition against 
retroactive rate making. 
1. Fuel Cost Pass-Through Cases Are Readily Distinguishable. River Gas Co. v. 
Public Util. Comm'n, 433 N.E. 2d 568 (Ohio 1982), is cited for the proposition that the 
rule against retroactive rate making was inapplicable to a refund ordered by the Ohio 
Public Utilities Commission under a purchase gas adjustment clause because the 
application of the clause did not constitute rate making in its usual and customary sense. 
River Gas distinguishes itself from our case. The Ohio court stated: 
At the outset, a distinction must be recognized between the statutory 
rate-making process involved in establishing fixed rate schedules, and the 
statutory procedure governing variable rate schedules under the fuel cost 
adjustment procedure. . . . 
[T]he fuel cost adjustment provisions . . . represent a statutory plan which 
authorizes a utility to pass variable fuel costs directly to consumers. Rates 
are thereby varied without prior approval of the commission, and indepen-
dently from the formal rate-making process . . . . 
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Id. at 571. 
Resellers also cite Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 576 P.2d 945 
(Cal. 1978). It is another case in which a court recognized that rate adjustments 
attributable to automatic fuel cost pass-throughs are not traditional rate making and are, 
therefore, not subject to the ban on retroactive rate making. Again, the court 
distinguished fuel cost pass-through cases from normal ratemaking such as occurred in our 
case and demonstrated why a refund cannot be granted under facts such as those present 
in our case. The Court said: 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. [Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n 401 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1965)] 
was precisely such a general ratemaking case. There the commission 
conducted an extensive investigation of the rates charged by the utility in 
question, found them to be unreasonably high, and fixed new lower rates. 
In addition, however, the commission ordered the utility to refund to its 
customers all charges collected in excess of the new rate level since the 
beginning of the investigation. The order, of course, resulted in the new 
general rate structure taking effect retroactively, a disposition which we ruled 
beyond the statutory power of the commission. 
We question neither the rule stated in the foregoing decisions nor its 
application to the facts there presented. But this is not such a case. At the 
risk of belaboring the obvious, we observe that before there can be retroactive 
ratemaking, there must be ratemaking . . . . [Emphasis in original.] 
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Id. at 946. MCI has cited several other fuel cost pass-through cases.34 None of these 
authorities supports their argument. 
The 1985 Rate Order, in which the rates Mountain Bell charged in 1987 and 1988 
were set, is the type of rate making which Resellers' authorities recognize is subject to the 
rule against retroactive ratemaking. Resellers' attempt to analogize the Complaint to fuel 
adjustment cases is inconsistent with the cases they cite and is clearly erroneous. 
2. Federal Income Tax Expenses Are Not Flowed-Through to Rate Payers. MCI 
argues that because rates are set to cover expenses and federal income tax expense is one 
of those expenses, federal income taxes are simply a flow-through item like fuel costs. 
MCFs argument continues that since tax expenses were reduced by TRA-86, dollars paid 
by ratepayers in excess of the reduced expense never legitimately belonged to Mountain 
Bell and can be refunded without violating fundamental ratemaking principles. (MCI Br. 
at 32-34). 
The primary case cited by MCI is Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 514 A.2d 1159 (D.C. 1986).35 In that case, the District of Columbia court upheld 
J4Other cases involving fuel adjustment clauses and their relationship to the rule against retroactive 
rate making cited by MCI include: Re Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 84 PUR 4th 364 (D.C. P.S.C 
1987); Gulf Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 487 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 1986); Business & Prof. People v. 
Commerce Comm'n, 525 N.E.2d 1053 (111. App. Ct. 1988); Util. Comm'n v. C F Industries, Inc., 263 S.E.2d 
559 (N.C. 1980); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Delmarva Power & Light, 400 A.2d 1147 (Md. 1979); Blackstone 
Valley Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 542 A.2d 242 (R.L 1988). 
•^MCI has cited other cases involving mechanisms similar to fuel adjustment clauses or specific statutes 
that authorize after-the-fact adjustments in rates. See Re Alascom, Inc., 81 PUR 4th 320 (Alaska P.U.C. 
1986); Cal. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 P.2d 98 (Cal. 1979); Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
448 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1984); Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 415 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 1982); Roberts v. 
Narragansett Elec. Co., 470 A.2d 215 (R.I. 1984). Such cases are not relevant to the issues presented in 
this case. 
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an order of the commission requiring Chesapeake and Potomac to refund to ratepayers 
an FCC ordered reimbursement from AT&T of a fund specifically collected and 
earmarked for a particular purpose. 
Our case is readily distinguishable. First, TRA-86 did not result in any refund to 
Mountain Bell of funds previously paid like the AT&T refund did. Second, Mountain 
Bell's federal tax expense is not a fixed amount specifically earmarked for a particular 
purpose. The level of income taxes varies with income. Income is projected in setting 
rates. However, it is a function of numerous factors which will vary in unforeseeable ways 
from the levels used in setting rates. Third, to a minor extent, federal tax expense is 
within the control of Mountain Bell based upon various tax planning alternatives. Fourth, 
Mountain Bell does not act as a conduit for federal income taxes anymore than it acts as 
a conduit for its employees' salaries or its suppliers' charges.36 It is possible to determine 
what portion of the revenue requirement established in any given general rate case is 
attributable to any one of Mountain Bell's actual or projected test-year expenses. 
However, this does not mean that if specific expense items vary up or down following the 
rate case, rate payers will receive a refund or be surcharged for the deviation from 
projected levels. Certainly, the Commission has never established a flow-through account 
for federal income taxes with an automatic rate adjustment mechanism, up or down, 
»See Utah Dep't of Business Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["WageCase"]. 
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depending on the taxes actually paid. To do so would violate the fundamental principles 
of rate making affirmed in the EBA Case.37 
C. Cases Cited by Resellers Involving TRA-86 or Other Tax Changes Do Not Support 
the Complaint. 
MCI dedicated a large portion of its memorandum below (and cites this portion of 
its memorandum in a footnote to its brief) to cases from many jurisdictions in which 
commissions took action to pass the benefits of TRA-86 on to rate payers.38 As noted 
above, this argument undermines Resellers' point that TRA-86 was not foreseeable. 
Otherwise, MCI's argument is irrelevant. The actions of other commissions have no 
bearing upon the appropriateness of the actions of the Utah Commission. Furthermore, 
the cases cited by MCI demonstrate why the Commission could not grant the refund 
sought in this case. In each case, commissions acted prospectively declaring rates interim 
or ordering rate reductions. 
MCI cites several cases involving other changes in tax laws in which commissions 
have responded by adjusting rates. A common thread which runs through the cases cited 
3
'MCI also cites Turpen v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 769 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1988) for this proposition. 
Turpen involved the return of shared expenses with AT&T. Like Chesapeake, the FCC had noted that the 
monies in Turpen were intended as direct reimbursements to customers. 
^For a response to MCI's footnote see Mountain Bell's memorandum below at 52-53. (R. at 520-
21) This body of case law has been expanded recently by the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission in Re 
Haw. Elec. Co., 102 PUR 4th 157 (Haw. Public Util. Comm'n 1989). In October 1988, an order to show 
cause was issued by the Hawaii Commission asking why Hawaii Electric's 1988 rates should not be lowered 
to reflect savings attributable to TRA-86. The Commission concluded that a refund in 1989 of 1988 rates 
to reflect tax savings would constitute retroactive rate making. 
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by MCI is that commissions have made these adjustments prospectively, not retroac-
tively.39 
CONCLUSION 
Careful review and analysis of Resellers' arguments and authorities reveals that they 
do not provide support for Resellers' claim that the Order is in error. The Commission's 
conclusions are, not only within the tolerable limits of reason, they are supported by the 
overwhelming weight of Utah and national authority. 
Mountain Bell has exclusively charged rates found just and reasonable in final 
Commission orders. Those rates have not been made interim or subject to refund. The 
Division and Commission responded appropriately to TRA-86. As soon as it became 
apparent that Mountain Bell was earning in excess of the rate of return found reasonable 
in the 1985 Rate Order, a rate reduction was made. As soon as it became apparent that 
the rate reduction was insufficient, a rate case was initiated which resulted in further rate 
3 9See Reedy Creek Utilities v. Fla. Public Serv. Comm'n, 418 So.2d 249 (Ha. 1982), (the Florida 
commission began its investigation prior to the effective date of the federal tax legislation and declared that 
utilities would be subject to refund prospectively for amounts collected exceeding a fair and reasonable 
return on their investment; furthermore, the parties had stipulated to a specific refund mechanism for 
revenues attributable to changes in the tax legislation); Citizens Energy Coalition, Inc. v. Ind. and Mich. 
Elec. Con 396 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (the court determined prospectively that federal tax expense 
which would not be paid in the future was not an includable expense for rate making purposes); Mich. Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (required amortization prospectively 
of reserve for state tax liability which was no longer needed); Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Public Util. 
Comm'n, 487 A.2d 118 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (reduced rate base in connection with parent company's loss 
carryover prospectively); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 698 P.2d 627 (Wyo. 1985) 
(excess deferred tax account to be amortized prospectively). 
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reductions. While Resellers' selective hindsight appears to show that larger or additional 
rate cuts might have been warranted earlier to account for the effects of TRA-86 and 
other changes, the law is clear that hindsight does not justify retroactive rate making. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order is correct and should be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 1990. 
ft frW^ ^\Q\[ (Vr^\ ltd &*S~v^(jl^ 
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54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after hearing. 
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates, 
fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications, or any of them demanded, ob-
served, charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product or 
commodity, or in connection therewith, including the rates or fares for excur-
sion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices or con-
tracts, or any of them, affecting such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or 
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the com-
mission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be 
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinaf-
ter provided. 
(2) The commission shall have power to investigate a single rate, fare, toll, 
rental, charge, classification, rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any 
number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts and practices, or 
any number thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after hearing, new 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts 
or practices, or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof. 
(3) The commission, in its determination of just and reasonable rates, may 
consider recent changes in the utility's financial condition or changes reason-
ably expected, but not speculative, in the utility's revenues, expenses or in-
vestments and may adopt an appropriate future test period, not exceeding 
twelve months from the date of filing, including projections or projections 
together with a period of actual operations in determining the utility's test 
year for rate-making purposes. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 4, § 3; C.L. 
1917, § 4800; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-4; L. 
1975, ch. 166, 9 1. 
54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission — Applica-
tion — Procedure — Prerequisite to court action. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, 
stockholder, bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public 
utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the 
requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any 
party to the action or proceeding, or any stockholder or bondholder or 
other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected may apply 
for rehearing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding. 
(b) No applicant may urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the 
application in an appeal to any court. 
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 
20 days is denied. 
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without 
suspending the order involved, the commission shall issue its deci-
sion on rehearing within 20 days after final submission. 
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing 
within 20 days, the order involved is affirmed. 
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(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or 
postponed, an application for review or rehearing does not excuse any 
corporation or person from complying with and obeying any order or 
decision of the commission. 
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies 
an original order or decision has the same force and effect as an original order 
or decision, but does not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right, 
arising from the original order or decision unless so ordered by the commis-
sion. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 5, § 14; C.L. ment, effective January 1, 1988, so rewrote 
1917, § 4S33; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-6-15; L. this section as to make a detailed analysis lm-
19S1, ch. 215, § 5; 1987, ch. 161, § 167. practicable. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
54-7-20. Reparations — Courts to enforce commission's or-
ders — Limitation of action. 
(1) When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate, 
fare, toll, rental or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service 
performed by any public utility, and the commission has found, after investi-
gation, that the public utility has charged an amount for such product, com-
modity or service in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the 
commission, or has charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory 
amount against the complainant, the commission may order that the public 
utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from 
the date of collection. 
(2) If the public utility does not comply with the order for the payment of 
reparation within the time specified in such order, suit may be instituted in 
any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the same. All complaints con-
cerning unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory charges shall be filed with the 
commission within one year, and those concerning charges in excess of the 
schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the commission shall be filed with the 
commission within two years, from the time such charge was made, and all 
complaints for the enforcement of any order of the commission shall be filed in 
court within one year from the date of such order. The remedy in this section 
provided shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy or remedies 
under this title in case of failure of a public utility to obey an order or decision 
of the commission. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 5, § 19; C.L. Cross-References. — As to limitations of 
1917, i 4838; L. 1929, ch. 43, § 1; R.S. 1933 & action to recover excessive charges or rates, see 
C. 1943, 76-6-20. § 78-12-29. 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Investi- ) DOCKET NO, 88-049-13 
gation into the Reasonableness) 
of the Rates and Charges of ) ORDER ON AMENDED REQUEST 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND ) FOR AGENCY ACTION 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY. ) 
ISSUED! March 30. 1939 
By the Commission: 
In this matter various consumers of telephone services 
and resellers of telephone services filed with the Commission an 
Amended Request for Agency Action on October 27, 1988. Subsequent-
ly, briefs vera filed by Petitioners, Respondent, Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell19), and the Division 
of Public Utilities ("Division"). In addition, the Commission 
allowed the parties oral argument of their respective positions. 
Petitioners seek to have the Commission declare that 
Mountain Bell is in violation of the Commission's Order in Docket 
No. 85-049-02, issued December 31, 1985, and to order Mountain Bell 
to refund to all Utah ratepayers those monies which the Commission 
finds that Mountain Bell earned in excess of its authorized rate of 
return for 1987 and 1988 as fixed in Docket No. 85-049-02. In 
particular, Petitioners argued that any over-earnings resulting 
from the 1986 Tax Reform Act be refunded. 
The Commission being fully advised in the matter has 
concluded that the arguments of Petitioners must be rejected for 
the reasons which follow. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Commission finds that Mountain Bell did earn in 
excess of its authorized rate of return in calendar years 1987 and 
1988. One of the reasons for the over-earning was the impact upon 
Mountain Bell of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
2. On December 9, 1986, the Commission sent a letter to 
the major utilities in the state requesting information on the 
anticipated impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. On January 20, 
1987, the Commission requested that the Division provide an 
analysis of the utilities1 responses. The Division filed such an 
analysis with the Commission on February 20, 1987. 
3. On June 1, 1987, the Committee of Consumer Services 
filed a Motion for Temporary Rates which argued that the rates of 
the major utilities be made temporary or that refund reserve 
accounts be established. A hearing was held June 30, 1987. At the 
conclusion of the hearing the Commission ruled that it had no 
evidentiary basis to declare the rates interim. 
4. Updated reports from the Division were filed with the 
Commission on June 5, 1987, and September 1, 1987. These reports 
did not recommend or suggest the need for any Commission action. 
Though positive impacts upon Mountain Bell's earnings were 
anticipated as a result of the 1986 Act, the Division was of the 
opinion that analysis would reveal off-sets to such impacts. 
5. The Commission's own analysis indicated no need to 
initiate a proceeding prior to the end of September as stated in 
the Commission's September 28, 1987, letter to the Division. 
00678 
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6. In addition to its analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, the Division undertook monthly reviews of Mountain Bell's 
earnings during 1987 and 1988. Such analysis was complicated 
during the time period in question by changes in the Mountain Bell 
accounting system, delays in preparation of Mountain Bell budgets, 
swings in monthly earning reports, etc. 
7. The Division and Mountain Bell negotiated a settle-
ment resulting in a reduction of approximately $9,000,000.00, which 
reduction was approved by the Commission in December, 1987, as a 
result of Mountain Bell's anticipated over-earnings in calendar 
year 1987. 
8. The Division requested that the Commission initiate 
an investigation of Mountain Bell's rates and charges in June, 
1988. 
9. The Commission finds that the Division made a good 
faith effort to accurately and correctly analyze the information 
provided to it by the utilities. 
OTHCM?8I0W8 QF LAW 
Although there are a number of sub-issues in this case, 
the main and controlling issue is simply whether or not the 
Commission may properly adjust rates retroactively. We are per-
suaded that the Supreme Court's decision in the so-called "EBA" 
case (Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
£2Saifi3iffl]l/ 720 P.2d 420, 1986) controls our action here. We read 
the EBA case to require that ratemaking occur prospectively only. 
We would agree that certain exceptions to the rule are reasonable; 
for example, where it could be demonstrated that the utility had 
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misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise misled 
regulators, or where a prior rate has been nullified as a result of 
a Supreme Court order, or possibly other situations could be 
suggested. However, none of those examples have been suggested in 
this case, nor any others that we would consider reasonable. The 
language in the EBA case is very clear that the rules against 
retroactive ratemaking exist to balance the risk between share-
holder and ratepayer; if the utility makes less money than was 
forecast, it canft expect to recoup it retroactively, and 
conversely, if the utility makes more than was anticipated, it 
keeps the excess until the Commission, through the ratemaking 
process, can adjust the rates to correct the imbalance. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will now make 
the following: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the petition 
for a retroactive refund be and is hereby denied. 
Any party, or any stockholder, bondholder, or other 
person pecuniarily interested in any public utility which is 
affected by this action, may apply for rehearing of any matter 
determined in this Order. The application for rehearing must be 
filed within 30 days after the issue date of this Order. An 
application for rehearing not granted by the Commission within 20 
days of filing is denied. If the application for rehearing is 
denied, a petition seeking judicial review of any matter determined 
in this Order must be filed within 30 days of the date the applica-
tion is denied. 
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1989. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 30th day of March, 
V_ 
Briarfi T/ St^Wart, iChairman 
Brent H. Cameron 
Commissioner Pro Tempore 
Attest: 
#^u^> Ma 
Jares M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Commi ssion Secretary 
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STANLEY K. STOLL 
THOMAS M. ZARR 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Tel America of 
Salt Lake City, Inc. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Investi-
gation into the Reasonableness 
of the Rates and Charges of 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Docket No. 88-049-18 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
OR REHEARING 
Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc. ("Tel-America"), 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 54-7-15 (1988) and 63-46b-l2 
(1988), for itself and on behalf of all Petitioners in this 
matter and all customers of Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell"), hereby seeks, by and 
through its attorneys of record, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
review or rehearing of the Commission's Order issued March 30, 
1989 (the "Order"), denying that the Amended Request for Agency 
Action filed by Petitioners, including Tel-America. 
For the reasons stated below, Tel-America respectfully 
requests the Commission to review the Order and following such 
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review to enter an order approving Petitioners' Request for 
Agency Action or, in the alternative, to order a rehearing on 
the issues in Docket No. 88-049-18. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Decision in Utah Department of Business Regulation 
v. Public Service Commission does not control the issues before 
the Commission in the instant matter. 
In the Order the Commission held that the so-called "EBA 
case'1 (Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) controlled and required 
that ratemaking occur prospectively only. As pointed out by 
both Tel-America and MCI Telecommunications Corporation ("MCI") 
the EBA case dealt only with the issue as to whether the 
Commission was authorized to allow a diversion of funds from 
the energy balancing account to UP&L's general account. The 
Court held that the Commission's regulatory authority does not 
permit "retroactive revenue adjustments in order to guarantee 
shareholders the rate of return initially anticipated". 720 
P.2d at 423. The Court did not hold that the customers cannot 
be given a refund as a means of enforcing the allowed rate of 
return authorized by the Commission. 
While the Commission indicated that it reads the EBA case 
to require that rate-making occur prospectively only, it does 
-2-
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recognize that there are certain exceptions -h« "- "he 
Commission c crael i ides, however, that the circumstances giving 
rise to Mountain Bell's over-earnings in *-be ; ;:stant- matter 
would not fall within the class exceptions which the 
Commission would consider reasonable. 
The Commission* s Findings of Fact that Mountai n BelII lid 
earn i n excess of its authorized rate of return in calendar 
yea: m d 1988" ai id ti lat "one UL the ^easons for the 
over-earning was the impact on Mountain Bell Tax Reform 
Act of 1 986" compels the Commission to conclude that the 
ci rcumstances fa] ] within that' range :)f exceptions which the 
Commission recognized. 
exception to the rule against retroactive rate-making 
has been established ,u i-i'xtraord] nar y a nd unforeseen, ev ents . 
That exception is clearly applicable in the instant case See 
N. Ray Narragansett Electric Co., 57 Pub Uti 1. Rep i tli (PUR) 
549 (R I. Pub. Uti 1 98 4); Marraqansett Electric Co, _ v. 
Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 1988). The Findings of Fact clearly 
demonstrate that even with the extensive analysis by the 
D - immiss^ ; 1 
the Committee Jonsumer Services("Committee the 
ramifications of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Mountain B e l l s 
e a r n i n g s e x c e e d e d i lit HI if i e l iiiiiii in I our " h e 
calendar years 1987 and 1988. Based on information provided by 
-3-
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Mountain Bell and the Division it appears the magnitude of the 
over-earnings may exceed $20 million. Mountain Bell's 
over-earnings would have been even greater except for the $9 
million revenue reduction in December of 1987, which was 
obviously insufficient to rectify the over earnings problem. 
Clearly, the nature of changes to the tax treatment for 
corporations and the corresponding impact of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act on Mountain Bell's earnings at the time the 
Commission's Order in Docket No. 85-049-02, issued December 31, 
1985 (the "1985 Order") were unknown and uncertain. Further, 
as evidenced by the Commission's Findings, the impact on 
earnings continued to be uncertain, unforeseeable and 
unanticipated through 1987 and 1988. While there may have been 
a good faith effort on the part of the Division to monitor and 
analyze the information provided to it by Mountain Bell, the 
simple fact remains that Mountain Bell was permitted to earn an 
amount greatly in excess of that to which it was entitled under 
the 1985 Order. 
The Order places the risk and burden of the impact of the 
1986 Tax Reform Act's impact on Mountain Bell's earnings solely 
on the ratepayers and rewards Mountain Bell for failing to 
immediately bring the existence of its overearnings to the 
attention of the Commission in order to rectify the situation. 
Mountain Bell has received a windfall based on an event over 
-4-
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which • ,-: absolutely no control and which ultimately proved 
f; 11 i h s t" <:i n I' l <"•! I !*: i e n e f i t: I f < ::) i i I) e c e m h e r "i", i"»B h t: I i e 
date on which the Commission sent its letter to the major 
uti1ities requesting informat ion or the anticipated impact • if 
i h P H H f i 1 i'i R e f n i rn Art I hi lit i ni|i .act c< ikl hid" »••' h e e n ..ICHILIE a t e l y 
quantified, the appropriate proceedings could have initiated, 
the matter resolved and the overearnings avoided. 
ratepayers must bear the burden of, and the utility receive the 
benefit from, an unanticipated and unexpected events over which 
t '!"""( I J in "i • I "III "ii "•"•" i f" "l1"! ""a, / ' i i i i i /" in, I ' i "I" * "i„ Ill f in j"""i ( "i, i i i "i HI "I I" I i "i "I i * "Il ' in i ill !«"» »"* « i « f i« I, ii«"« • « • j i c ' Hi i i 1 i , |f i icl'uii 1 it I ci i i 1 \ mi cm Lit II a t : t ,\ „;l v l 1 i iici, I i ix : i ci i c f a y cir i a 
must bear the burden the Division's inability to accurately 
monitor utility's earnings and the Commission's inabil : ? 
prescribed by it 
Tel-America submits that the EBA case cited by the 
i c»irwn j s s II i ,11in ! inn in t H < 'i r i:1 w i dilli J IH i m 11 j m i„ o11L m i,11 111 i I n H II I.I s t a i 11 in«• 
and that the exception to the ru le against: retroactive 
rate-making should be applied in the instant case. 
2. The Commission's Order is Arbitrary, Capricious and 
Contrary to Law. 
Tel-America submits that the Commission's Order 
trary , capricious and contrar the reasons citec .. 
Tel-America's Memorandum of Points and Authorities Ji Support 
it Amended Request for Agency Action, dated December 20, 1988, 
- 5 - • 
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MCI's Memorandum in Support of its Request for Agency Action, 
dated December 20, 1988, Tel-America's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Amended Request for Agency Action, dated February 
21, 1989, and MCI's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Request 
for Agency Action, dated February 21, 1989. Tel-America hereby 
incorporates the afore-described memorandum by this reference 
in its Motion for Review or Rehearing for the purposes of Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). Further, Tel-America respectfully 
requests the Commission to review the arguments set forth in 
said memoranda. 
3. The Commission has the Authority to Require Mountain 
Bell to Refund its Earnings in Excess of the Amount Authorized 
by the 1985 Order. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20, the Commission has 
the authority to order the refund requested by Petitioners in 
Docket No. 88-049-18 for the reparations required for unjustly 
and unreasonably charged ratepayers. Further, Utah Code Ann. 
S 54-4-1 provides the Commission with express and clearly 
implied authority to require Mountain Bell to refund the 
overearnings at issue. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 
in New York Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 826 F.2d 1101 (D.C, Cir. 1987), 
-6-
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wherein the Court of Appeals found that the FCC had authority 
1
 • order AT&T to refund overearnings in excess of the prescri bed 
"il hfji i Jin, r 1 jiiinl i h i! i IIIM u u a s n o r e t r o a c t i » e 
ratemaking because the utility s obligations were set 01 it 
prospective! t he rate of return *?as or i gina] ] y 
i lie- in ilit ,.<' *i < .1 IIHIII'J ireqi lired mere] } n: :» 
give up that which the utility should not have collected in 
light of the rate return prescripts - d at 1 il 08 Whi le 
ffers w:li th respect 
to that of the Commission'J- i:\ :^ - - • prescribed1"" rates of 
return, the rationale employed --.-t i s applicable i n 
the instant matter. * i se tl Commission 
established allowed rate return pursuant tlie ! 18 3 
Order. Mountain Bell has clearly violated the Commission's 
Order by exceeding specified rate if return, Mountain Bell 
should * required "ve up that which should not have 
collected :i ii the instance and would - collected if 
Mountain Bell had immediately brought the matter fo the 
Commission's attention. Alternatively, Mountain Bell should 
i lot be allowed retain that which :i t: would have collected 
had the Division correctly analyzed the impact < J£ the r?8b Tax 
Reform Act. 
7.. 
0(Jf]!: [ 
4. The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment Requires that 
Mountain Bell Refund its Excess Earnings. 
The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment should be employed by the 
Commission to prevent a windfall which Mountain Bell insists on 
retaining. Mountain Bell should not be permitted to shield 
itself behind the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
arbitrarily applied in order to retain overearnings by which it 
has been unjustly enriched to the detriment of Utah ratepayers. 
The Commission should act under its equitable powers to require 
Mountain Bell to refund that which rightfully belongs to the 
ratepayers. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated upon, Tel-America respectfully 
requests the Commission to review or rehear its Order issued 
March 30, 1989, denying Petitioners' Request for Agency Action 
and following such review, to enter an order approving 
Petitioners1 request, or, in the alternative, set the matter 
for rehearing as requested herein. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 1989. 
SNOW, WlISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
S^pms M. ZKT 
Attorneys for Tel-America of 
Salt Lake City, Inc. 
SCMSKS463 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of April, 1989, 
I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition 
for Review or Rehearing to be mailed, postage prepaid to 
the following; 
Michael Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Sandy Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Committee of Consumer Services 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah R41U 
Ted D. Smith, Esq. 
U.S. West Communications/ 
Mountain Bell 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 41 ] 1 
James J. Cassity, Esq 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Exchange Carriers of Utah 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utai: I 841] 1 
Randy L. Dryer, Esq. 
MCI Telecommunications Corporation 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 11898 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , 111 ..ill A4 I 4 7 • OflQB 
Wendy A. Faber, Esq. 
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinqer 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City., Utah 841 01 
Gregory B. Monson, Esq. 
Watkiss & Campbell 
310 South Main Street, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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RANDY L. DRYER ..:^  .,-,- _ . - -
of and for ~' 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for MCI Telecommunications 
Corporation 
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , 'iiiilii Ml I 
P .O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Investi- Docket No. 88-049-18 
gation into the Reasonablenes 
of the Rates and Charges of PETITION OF MCI TELE-
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR REVIEW 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, OR REHEARING 
COMES NOW MCI Telecommunications Corporation ("MCI 
pursi lant t : U tah code Ann. • ;• 
(1988), for itself and on behalf of petitioners 
matter and all customers of U.S. West, formerly known as Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegrapl i Comj >a ntj ( 'Mc * in i:a :ii i i Bel II ' ) i I 
hereby seeks, by and through its attorneys, a review or rehearing 
of the Commission's Order issued March 30, 1989 (the "Order 
deny i ii IJ t: hs • Amended Request fur Ai |m 1111 y t\i 1 1111 m 
Petitioners, including MCI. 
This Petition for Review or Rehearing is based upon the 
f jrc " in cliit 
1! rhat the Commission erred in, coxicluding that the 
case of Utah Department of Business Regulations v. Public Service 
Commission, 3 20 1? • 2d 420 (Utah 1986) i si controlling 'Til Lhe I M ^ S I 
issues before the Commission in this matter. 
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2. That the Commission erred in refusing to order 
reparations as required by Utah Code Ann, S 54-7-20; and 
3. That the Commission's Order is otherwise arbi-
trary, capricious and contrary to law. 
4. MCI also joins in and incorporates by this refer-
ence, the arguments made by Tel-America of Salt Lake City, Inc. 
in its Petition for Review or Rehearing filed in this matter. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 1989. 
RAN&Y L/" tJRYER /) 
of\ and^fibr J 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for MCI 
-2- 00695 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION OF MCI 
TELECOMMUNICATION FOR REVIEW OR REHEARING to the following on 
this 1st day of May, 1989; 
Michael Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Sandy Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Committee of Consumer Services 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Ted D, Smith, Esq. 
U.S. West Communications/ 
Mountain Bell 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James J, Cassity, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Exchange Carriers of Utah 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stanley K. Stoll 
Thomas M. Zarr 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAX) 
Tel America of Salt Lake City, Inc. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Wendy A, Faber, Esq. 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BENDINGER 
136 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gregory B. Monson, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^ 
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DOCKETED 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Investigation ) 
into the Reasonableness of the ) DOCKET NO, 88-049-18 
Rates and Charges of MOUNTAIN ) 
STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH ) ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
COMPANY. ) 
ISSUED: Mav 18. 1989 
BY THE COMMISSION: 
In this matter the Commission issued its Order rejecting 
Petitioners1 Amended Request for Agency Action on March 30, 1989. 
The Request sought to have the Commission declare that Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") was in 
violation of a prior Commission rate order by reason of its over* 
earning and order a refund of the amount of the overearning. 
Subsequently, Petitioners filed Petitions for Review or 
Rehearing within the time requirements of Section 63-46b-19, Utah 
Code. The review Petitions were filed pursuant to Section 54-7-15, 
Utah Code, which requires that a party dissatisfied with a Commission 
order first file a request for rehearing before taking an appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court* 
The Petitions raise as arguments for review or rehearing 
essentially thm following: (1) The EBA case (Utah Department of 
Business Rtqulfttlon y t Public StrYict CgmiaaiQn, 720 p. 2d 420 (Utah 
1986) does not control this case and does not prevent the Commission 
from retroactively ordering a refund of over earnings; (2) the 
Commission's Order is arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law; 
(3) the Commission has authority to order reparations under Utah code 
Appendix 5 00703 
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Ann. Section 54-7-20; and (4) the doctrine of unjust enrichment 
requires a refund. 
These are the same arguments raised by Petitioners 
previously and present nothing not already considered by the 
Commission in the formulation of its March 30, 1989 Order in this 
matter. To reiterate our position, the EBA case prohibits the use 
of retroactive ratemaking, save under limited circumstances which are 
not present in this case. The proscription of retroactive ratemaking 
balances risk between ratepayer and shareholder and, therefore, rests 
on solid policy ground. Dressing up a retroactive rate adjustment 
in the guise of a reparation or the avoidance of unjust enrichment 
makes it no less retroactive. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the request for 
review or rehearing be and is hereby denied. Petitioners are advised 
that they have thirty (30) days from the issuance of this Order 
within which to take an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 18th day of May, 1989. 
ATTEST: 
Stephen C. 
cMr 
St . Hewlett 
Commission Secretary 
Brian T) S£*var£, Ct hairman 
faaitH. Byrn., Coma£Mion«r 
00704 
CONCURRING COMMENTS OF COMMISSIONER PRO TEMPORE BRENT H- CAMERON 
Ratemaking should be prospective in almost all circum-
stances. If this Commission were to accept the argument that the 
overearnings of Mountain Bell in 1987 or 1988 were nothing more than 
a windfall, as Petitioners suggest, I believe fundamental fairness 
would dictate that we undertake an analysis of prior periods of 
underearnings. Furthermore, there is the issue of how far back we 
would have to extend such analysis. 
Although there are factual differences between the EBA case 
and the instant case, I believe a consideration of the facts of this 
case clearly leads to the conclusion that this is not a case which 
merits an exemption from the general rule against retroactive 
ratemaking. 
Brent H. Cameron 
Commissioner Pro Tempore 
007(,5 
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:
 Mountain Bell 
A US W€STCOMPANY 
W. Mack Lawrence 250 9«fl Pfaza 
Utah Vica President and Post Offfca 3ox 30960 
Chief Executive Officer Salt Lake City, Utan 84120 
Phone i30l) 237-6291 
December 31, 1936 
Mr. Ted D. Stewart, Chairman 
Public Service Commission 
130 Sast 300 South 
Hebec Wells Building, 4th Floor 
s a l t Lake City, Utah 34111 
Dear Ted: 
We have made an analysis of the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
and estimated the impacts on Mountain Bell's atah operations. Our 
analysis shows it will affect our cash flow and our federal income 
tax expense. The changes in the law relating to the coat recovery 
system (depreciation), the elimination of investment tax credits, 
and capitalisation of previously expensed items will affect our tax 
payments, and thus our cash flow. The changes relating to 
capitalisation of previously expensed items and tax rata reductions, 
including the payback of deferred taxes, affect our federal income 
tax expense. 
The attached schedules summarise our current estimates of these 
changes* The impacts on federal income tax expanse are baaed on 
1986 data foe Utah which includes 10 months actual results and 2 
montha budget. The data presents the changes dua to incorporating a 
40% tax rata (1987 effective rata) and a 34% rata (1988 effective 
rate). 
The Initial impacts on our cash flow will be negative while at the 
seme time federal lacoaa tax expense will ba reduced* Looking 
further* simply at significant and known separations changes* the 
tax law is a critical factor in averting rata requests* For 
example, as shown by the data on Attachment 2, the 13.9 million 
reduction in revenue requirement due to tax changes is partially 
offset by the 14*2 million increase in intrastate expenses dua to 
separations changes* Also, you should be aware that thaaa exhibits 
do not consider ongoing changes in the coat of operating our 
business • e.g* wags increases, certain state and local tax 
increases, and additional interast expense dua to the loss of 
investment tax credits (ITC). 
Appendix 6 00530 
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December 31, 1386 
Considering all of the data, I feel very good about the possibility 
of rate stability for our customers over the next few years. The 
benefits of the 1986 Tax Reform Act will go to ratepayers since they 
work to offset intrastate expense increases in our continuously 
changing industry* 
If we can be of further help or assistance, we will be glad to 
discuss this response with you* 
Wishing you and each of your staff members a Happy New Year! 
Yours truly, 
Attachments 
Issued to: atah Public Service Commission - Chairman Ted Stewart 
and Commissioners Brent Cameron and Jim Byrne 
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1996 TAX REFORM ACT 
ATTACHMENT t 
MOUNTAIN BELL - UTAH 
TOTAL STATE CASH FLOU IMPACTS 
• MILLIONS 
AREAS OF CHANSEt 19fl7<*«tl 1991(3411 
REPEAL OF INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (ITC) 
TAX RATE REDUCTION 
DEPRECIATION CHANGES 
LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE OEOUCT. 
•CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
LOSS OF RESERVE METHOD FOR IAO OEITS 
TOTAL CASH FLOU IMPACT -6.9 • .5 
-9.6 
•7.6 
-4.1 
" \l 
-16.7 
+IS.S 
- * . l 
• .2 
ASSUMPTIONS* THE CASH FLOU ANALYSIS REFLECTS THI TAX ACTS 
CHANtffS LISTED ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS THEY HAVE ON THE COMPANY'S 
TAX PAYMENTS FOR UTAH TOTAL STATE. 
• PRIOR TO ISO? ANO THf TAX REFORM ACT, SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES, 
RELIEF ANO PENSIONS ANO THI O U T PORTION OF IOC (INTEREST OURINt 
CONSTRUCTION) Ufftf CAPITALIZED FOR SOON PURPOSES SUT OSOUCTEO FOR 
TAX PURPOSES WITH THE RESULTANT SAVINSS FLOWED THROUSH TO 
RATEPAYERS. UNOfH TAX REFORM THESE COSTS ARE NO LONSIR 
OEOUCTISLE. 
1396 TAX REFORM ACT 
JTACHMENT Z 
MOUNTAIN BgLL - UTAH, 
INTRASTATE EXPgNSg IMPACTS 
NORMALIZED FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXPENSE 
f MILLIONS 
AREAS OF CHAN6EJ 431 TAX RATg(19B7) 
•TAX RATE REDUCTION - 6.6 
LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCT. + .1 
CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS +2.3 
INVESTMENT TAX CREOIT (ITC )-OEPRECIATION - .1 
INVESTMENT TAX CREOXT UTO-AMORTIZATION * .4 
TOTAL TAX EXPENSE CHAN6C - 3.3 t 
taa7 TMTMITOTf WtVINUt HtOUlBgMENT TNCMEAMl 
• MILLIONS 
SPF <SUSSCRX1IK FLANT FACTOR) PHASI-OOWN • 1.3 
CFI (CUSTOMER PftfMISI EQUIP.) FHASI-OUT —+JL1 
TOTAL XNTRASTATt REVINUt REQUIREMENT CHANS! • 4.2 
• XNCLUOKS RATI CHANtf. OfFERRIO TAX FLOUSACK. ANO 
OEFRECIATION CHANtCS. 
• REVENUE MULTIPLIER • t .77M 
1988 TAX REFORM ACT 
ATTACHMENT 3 
MOUNTAIN flgLL - UTAH 
INTRASTATE EXPENSg IMPACTS, 
NORMALIZED FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXPENSE 
« MILLIONS 
AREAS OF CHANSEl 341 TAX RftTg(19afl) 
•TAX RATE REDUCTION -13. J 
LOSS OF MISC. BUSINESS EXPENSE OEOUCT. + .1 
CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS +2.9 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (ITO-DEPRECIATION - .1 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT <ITC)-AMORTIZATI0N • .A 
TOTAL TAX EXPENSE CHAN6E - 9.9 t 
1988 CUHULATIVt INTRASTATt REVENUE Rg OUT REM* NT INCRgMfl 
• MILLIONS 
SPF <SUBSCRIBER PLANT FACTOR) PHASI-OOUN • 2.1 
CPI <CUSTOMER PREMSI EQUIP.) PHASE-OUT • 4.1 
••USOAR CAPITAL TO iXPtNBE SHIFTS 
TOTAL INTRASTATE REVENUE REQUIREMENT CHAN8E +!0.3 
• INCLUOIS RATI CHANif, DSFERRfO TAX FLOUBACK. ANO DEPRECIATION 
CHtVMCS 
•• UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNT! REWRITE EFFECTIVE !-!-•• 
t REVENUE MULTIPLIER • I.1131 
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MEMORANDUM 
DATE: February 20, 1987 
TO: 
FROM: 
Public Service Commission 
Ji 
Ralph N. Creer, Director ^ ^ 
D i v i s i o n of Publ ic U t i l i t i e s 
STATIOFIHAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESSREGULATION 
NORMAN H. BANCERTER. GOVERNOR 
WILLIAM L DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
RE: Case No. 87-999-01 
Analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and 
Investigation of the Effects on Utah Power & Light 
Company, Mountain Fuel Supply Company and Mountain Bell 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will generally have the effect 
of lowering the tax liability of utility companies and 
therefore the rates that consumers should pay. The Division of 
Public Utilities recommends that each company be treated on a 
individual basis to see if the lower tax liability is offset by 
other factors which would cause rates to consumers to rise. 
The Division recommends that Mountain Bell's rates not be 
reduced at this time for the effects of the 1986 Act, but that 
the Division continue to monitor the company's earnings on a 
monthly basis to determine if significant changes occur. The 
Division needs more information before it can make a 
recommendation for Utah Power & Light Company and Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company 
INTRODUCTION 
By letter dated December 9, 1986, the Commission requested 
Utah Power & Light Company, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and 
Mountain Bell to provide information concerning the effects the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have on each company. The 
Commission requested each company "to use calendar year 1985 as 
the basis for deriving company revenue requirements under old 
versus new tax law assumptions," and to provide the same 
information for 1986 as soon as it was available and to extend 
the report a sufficient number of years forward to fully 
portray the information requested. The companies were 
requested to respond by December 31, 1986. The Division was 
ordered to review the information submitted by each company, 
conduct its own analysis of the 1986 Act and to report the 
results by February 2, 1987. This date was later extended to 
February 20, 1987- 0 0 5 3 6 
DIVISION OF F W U C UTILITIES / RALPH N. CREER. DIRECT:* 
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Utah Power replied to the Commission's request by letter 
dated December 31, 1986. The company suggested that the data 
for the year 1985 was outdated and would require too many 
adjustments to be reflective of its current situation, that the 
same would be true of the year 1986, and requested leave to 
present the information based upon the year 1987. 
Mountain Bell also replied to the Commission's request by 
letter dated December 31, 1986. The company's estimates of the 
impacts of the tax changes were based on 1986 data for Utah 
which included 10 months actual results and 2 months budget. 
Mountain Fuel replied to the Commission's request by letter 
dated January 9, 1987. The company used an analysis of actual 
1985 results to show the magnitude of the tax law changes. 
The Committee of Consumer Services filed a petition on 
January 7, 1987 for an investigation to determine the effects 
of the 1986 Act upon the revenue requirements of utilities 
operating under the jurisdiction of the Commission. This 
petition has been designated as Case No. 87-999-01 and all of 
the information submitted by the companies has been included in 
this docket. 
The Division has attempted to analyze the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 as it relates to public utilities, has reviewed the 
information supplied by the utility companies, and has 
requested and reviewed additional information from the 
companies. 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 
The following summary outlines some of the provisions of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that directly affect public utility 
rate making. 
CORPORATE TAX RATE 
The 1986 Act decreases the maximum corporate income tax 
rate from 46 percent to 34 percent effective July 1, 1987. The 
effective tax rate for 1987 is 40 percent. The effect of the 
rate reduction is to reduce both book tax expense and tax 
liability. 
DEFERRED TAXES 
Deferred taxes arise when there are differences between the 
way items are treated for book purposes and the way they are 
treated for tax purposes. The utility usually records more 
taxes on its books than it actually pays. The difference 
between book and tax depreciation is one of the major causes 
for deferred taxes. The 1986 Act continues the rule that 
public utility property is eligible for Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (ACRS) only if the tax benefits of ACRS are 
normalized in setting rates charged by utilities to customers 
and in reflecting operating results in regulated books of 
account. The deferred tax reserve has been building up over 
- 2 -
00537 
write-off method. Telephone outside plant also received 
favorable treatment through retention of the existing 
15-year/150 percent declining balance treatment. The effect of 
these changes is to increase the spread between book and tax 
depreciation thereby providing additional deferred tax reserves 
which partially offsets the loss of deferred tax reserves 
caused by the tax rate reduction. 
CAPITALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
Interest incurred on debt used to finance construction and 
other construction costs must be capitalized and deducted over 
the tax lives of the property. In the past, such costs were 
immediately deductible for tax purposes and the savings were 
flowed through to ratepayers. The effect of this change is to 
increase book tax expense and tax liability. 
UNBILLED REVENUES 
The 1986 Act contains a provision requiring public 
utilities to include unbilled revenues in taxable income for 
the year in which the utility services are rendered to 
customers. This provision becomes effective for tax years 
beginning after December 31, 1986 and has a four year phase-in 
mechanism. The effect of this provision is to increase taxable 
income. However, Utah Power is already recognizing unbilled 
revenues for rate making purposes so there will be no effect on 
consumer rates. 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION 
The 1986 Act subjects contributions in aid of construction 
(CIAC) received after December 31, 1986 to taxation as ordinary 
income in the year received. However, property purchased with 
these funds will be allowed to be depreciated for tax purposes 
under ACRS or any other applicable depreciation method. The 
old law permitted electric, gas, water and sewer regulated 
public utilities to treat CIAC as nontaxable contributions to 
capital, but did not allow any deductions such as depreciation 
or ITC to be taken with respect to CIAC. The effect of this 
provision is to increase" taxable income but not book income. 
RESERVE FOR BAD DEBTS 
The 1986 Act eliminates the use of a reserve for bad debts 
for tax purposes. The present balance in reserve for tax 
purposes must be written off over a four year period. 
MINIMUM TAX 
The 1986 Act imposes a tax of 20 percent on alternative 
minimiun taxable income for corporations, payable to the extent 
that it exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax. The alternative 
minimum tax takes into consideration tax preferences such as 
depreciation, tax exempt interest on private activity bonds, 
untaxed appreciation on charitable contributions, certain 
accounting methods, excess amortization on pollution control 
facilities, etc. 
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the years based on the tax rates in effect at the ti 
recently at a 46% rate. Now that the tax rate is reduf 
percent/ there is more money in the reserve than th 
will actually have to pay in taxes. The extra res**., 
referred to as -excess deferred taxes.* 
The Act establishes the -average rate assumption method" 
as the method for flowing back to ratepayers deferred income 
tax reserves. This method "reduces the excess deferred tax 
reserve over the remaining regulatory lives of the property 
which gave rise to the reserve for deferred taxes.- Reducing 
excess reserves more rapidly than ratably would effectively 
lower taxable income of the utility industry, thus resulting in 
reduced tax payments to the U. S. Treasury. Congress therefor 
made specific provisions to prevent regulators from returning 
the excess quickly. A violation of this provision will 
preclude the utility from utilizing accelerated tax 
depreciation methods on all assets and require the use of book 
or rate making methods of depreciation for computing tax 
liability. Representative Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., backed by the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(NARUC) and various consumer groups, recently introduced 
legislation that would allow state regulators to determine how 
to refund excess deferred taxes. 
The lowering of the overall tax rate creates a problem for 
those utilities that have been using deferred taxes as a major 
source of internal financing. A lower tax rate results in 
fewer dollars flowing into the deferred tax reserve, and the 
ratepayers would lose the benefit of these lower capital costs. 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS 
The regular Investment Tax Credit (ITC) is repealed for 
property placed in service after December 31, 1985. ITC is 
also a source of internal financing. Existing deferred ITC 
balances will continue to be ratably flowed back to ratepayers 
over the lives of the related assets. It appears that the loss 
of ITC in the near term will have minimal impact on 
ratepayers. The primary impact is loss of cash flow to the 
utilities. 
DEPRECIATION 
The Act generally lengthens asset depreciation lives. 
However, certain items critical to the modernization of the 
public telephone network received special treatment, 
specifically computer based central office equipment and 
telephone distribution plant. It appears, from a depreciation 
point of view, that the telephone companies are better off 
under the new law. The new depreciation system favors modern 
computer based central office equipment over the older version 
of central office technology by allowing a five year life as 
opposed to a seven year life. It also establishes a 200 
percent declining balance schedule for computer based central 
offices in place of the existing 150 percent declining balance 
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with the company's projections for 1987 operations along with 
supporting detail. The information was requested to be 
presented in a general rate case format and should reflect the 
data both on a total company basis and on a Utah jurisdictional 
basis. The company has indicated a willingness to provide the 
data to the Division, but if it does not the Division will 
request the Commission to order the company to do so. 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
The Division reviewed the report submitted by Mountain 
Bell, the supporting detail and the logic used to develop the 
1987 and 1988 tax change impacts. The Division requested 
backup detail and held discussions with company accounting and 
tax personnel in Salt Lake City and Denver. Attachment 1 shows 
the Division's interpretation of the results. Although the 
numbers are estimates, Attachment 1 shows that the net 
reduction in taxes is partially offset by increased costs. The 
net effect is increased earnings of $1,200,000 for 1987 and 
$1,700,000 for 1988* The corresponding revenue effects are 
$2,100,000 and $2,700,000. 
The Division reviewed the 1986 actual results and then 
adjusted those results by including the tax changes that will 
be in effect in 1987 and the potential shifts in jurisdictional 
costs that will occur in 1987 to determine the impact on the 
company's earnings and rate of return on equity. The shifts in 
costs are primarily related to the mandate of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) for phase-out of customer 
premise equipment (CPE) and the phase down of the subscriber 
plant factor (SPF). The results are summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Return 
on 
Earnings Equity 
1986 Actual Unadjusted $55.8 11.77% 
1986 Adjusted for 1987 Tax Changes 59.1 12.88% 
1986 Adjusted for 1987 Tax Changes 
and Shifts in Costs 57.0 12.16% 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Utah Power stated in its response to the Commission's 
letter that the impact of the tax law changes and a potential 
increase in the state franchise tax rate of 1 percent, results 
in a Utah jurisdictional revenue requirement reduction of 
$11,200,000 based on the 1987 budget. However, there are many 
other issues that impact the revenue requirement. The Division 
cannot estimate the impact of the tax law changes in 
combination with other revenue requirement issues based on the 
information supplied by the company. 
By letter dated January 30, 1987, a copy of which is on the 
Commission's docket file, the Division requested Utah Power to 
provide a detailed jurisdictional allocation study similar to 
that used in general rate cases using the company's 1987 
operating budget as a basis. The Division needs this 
information before it can recommend that consumer rates be 
reduced for the tax law changes, or if its benefits are offset 
by other issues. The company has not yet responded to the 
Division's request. If the company is unwilling to supply the 
Division with the company's 1987 operating budget in the form 
of a jurisdictional allocation study, the Division will request 
the Commission to order Utah Power to do so. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
The letter filed by Mountain Fuel in response to the 
Commission's request included the company's computations of the 
affects of the tax law changes as applied to the results of 
operations for the year 1985. These computations showed a 
potential reduction in the Utah cost of service of 
approximately $1,300,000. The Division requested and has 
recently received, but has not had sufficient time to analyze, 
the company's computation of the affects off the tax law changes 
as applied to 1986 operations. Preliminary indications show 
similar results to 1985 but at an even lower level. 
The Division his examined the 1985 data available and has 
requested detailed supporting information for 1985 as well as 
automatic updates on 1986 data as it becomes available. The 
analysis of the. 1985 data provided thus far shows that the 
results presented by Mountain Fuel for 1985 will probably not 
change materially* The Division believes that those results by 
themselves would not be significant enough to justify a rate 
case. However, s rate case would be justified if there were 
other adjustments of significant magnitude that also decrease 
the cost of service. On the other hand. Mountain Fuel has 
indicated that there are other changes occuring in the 
1986-1987 time frame which tend to offset the potential 
benefits associated with lower tax rates. The company has not 
provided any information to elaborate or quantify such changes. 
The Division has requested that Mountain Fuel provide it 
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of 14.2 percent. Although capital costs have declined since 
the last rate case, the returns shown are substantially below 
14.2 percent. It is the Division's understanding that the Utah 
operations ranked sixth among the seven states in terms of the 
rate of return earned on equity for 1986. 
In light of the circumstances discussed above, the 
Division is of the opinion that the Commission should not order 
Mountain Bell to reduce rates at this time for the reduction in 
Federal tax rates. The Division monitors Mountain Bell's 
earnings on a monthly basis. If significant changes occur in 
terms of excessive earnings, the Division will petition the 
Commission for an order to show cause why the company's rates 
should not be reduced. 
Copies to: 
Utah Power & Light Company 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
Mountain Bell 
Committee of Consumer Services 
William E. Dunn 
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The Division obtained the company's budget view for 1987 
and performed an analysis similar to that for 1986. There are 
several major changes that will probably occur in 1987. The 
first change is for Post Retirement Medical/Dental (PRM&D) 
benefits. These benefits are currently accounted for on a pay 
as you go basis. The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) will be issuing a technical bulletin adopting actuarial 
accounting for book purposes for these costs which is similar 
to pension expense accounting. It is expected that the 
technical bulletin will probably allow voluntary early 
adoption. If this is the case, it would reduce earnings by 
$3,200,000 in 1987. 
The second major change that will occur is in the 
separations procedures for Category 6 (local dial switching 
equipment) plant. The Federal and State Joint Board is 
expected soon to recommend to the FCC changes in Category 6 
which will shift costs to the intrastate jurisdiction. If the 
FCC approves the changes and they become effective in 1987, 
there could be an additional decrease in 1987 earnings of 
$2,300,000. 
The forecast for 1987 shows that Mountain Bell's rate base 
has declined by $16,000,000 over 1986. This is primarily a 
result of the impact of the new depreciation rates approved by 
the Commission and the FCC, which became effective January 1, 
1986. Table 2 summarizes the results of these adjustments. 
TABLE 2 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Return 
on 
Earnings Equity 
1987 As Budgeted $56.6 12.80% 
1987 Adjusted for PRM&D Costs 53.4 11.72% 
1987 Adjusted for PRM&D and 
Category 6 Costs 51.2 10.94% 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have the effect of 
lowering Mountain Bell's rates. However, the known and 
potential changes in costs would increase rates. The net 
effect does not have a significant impact on the rate of return 
earned on equity. The company is currently authorised a return 
- 7 -
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Attachment 1 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Impact on Earnings 
Increase/(Deerease) 
Tax Changes 40* Rate 34% Rate 
Tax Rate Reduction $ 4.3 $ 8.8 
Excess Deferred Tax Flow Back 2.3 4.4 
Capitalization of Construction Costs (2.9) (2.9) 
Loss of Portion of Business 
Expense Deduction (0.1) (0.1) 
Investment Tax Credit - Depreciation 0.1 0.1 
Investment Tax Credit -
Amortization (Flow Back) 
Net Increase in Earnings 
from Tax Changes 
Cost Changes 
SPF Phase Down 
CPE Phase-out 
Uniform System of Accounts 
Capital to Expense Shifts 
Depreciation Represcription 
Net Decrease in Earnings 
from Cost Changes 
Net Increase in Earnings 
Net Revenue Effect of the 
Increased Earnings 
- 9 
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(0-4) (0-4? 
$ 3.3 $ 9.9 
( 0 . 7 ) 
( 1 . 4 ) 
( 1 . 4 ) 
( 2 . 1 ) 
( 2 . 2 ) 
( 2 . 5 ) 
S (2.1? 
$ 1.2 
t (8.2) 
t 1.7 
Tab 8 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
4th FLOOR. HEBER M WELLS BUILDING, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P 0. BOX 45585. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145 
TELEPHONE. (801) 530-6716 
NORMAN H BANGERTER COMMISSIONERS 
GOVERNOR BRIAN T. (TED) STEWART CHAIRMAN 
BRENT H. CAMERON 
JAMES M. BYRNE 
EXECUTIVE STAFF DIRECTOR 
DOUGLAS C W KIRK 
COMMISSION SECRETARY 
December 9 , 1986 STEPHENc.HEWLETT 
W. M. Lawrence 
Vice President and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Mountain Bell 
P.O. Box 30960 
Salt L»km City, Utah 84125 
f».Jt 
Dear Mr>Jiarwre"ncet 
Aa you are aware, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 brings a 
number of changes that may affect a utility in ways that may not 
be self-evident. The new law, for example, may affect earnings 
and the financial condition of your company. It may decrease 
utility expenses, making consumer savings possible. These are 
things the Commission wishas to learn. Therefore we request a 
report from you addreasing the subjects of our concern. 
We are particularly intarastad in learning what changes 
may occur in currant corporate income tax payments, in accumu-
lated deferred tax accounta, in the new cost recovery system 
which modifies tha Accelerated Coat Recovery System (ACRS); of 
the effects of tha elimination of investment tax credits and all 
other Tax Reform Act of 1986 changes* and of resultant changes in 
revenue requirement. We want to know tha overall affects on your 
company of the new law, tha timing of those effacts, and what you 
may propose as tha distribution of tha benefits of tha new law 
between stockholders and ratepayers. 
We would like your report to usa calendar year 1985 as 
tha basis for deriving company revenue requirement under old 
versus naw tax law assumptions, and will expect the same for 1986 
as soon as information is complete. We request that your report 
extend a sufficient number of yeara forward to fully portray the 
information we are requesting. 
00588 
We ask that you supply us with this report, or at 
minimum a detailed summary of a more extensive analysis, by 
December 31, 1986. We will order the Division of Public 
Utilities to conduct its own analysis, to review yours, and to 
report the results to us by February 2, 1986. Upon receipt of 
this information, we will determine how to proceed thereafter. 
Sincerely, 
Brian T. Stewart 
Chairman 
BTS/bs 
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Tab 9 
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DATE: June 5, 1987 
TO: 
FROM: 
Public Service Commission 
Ralph N. Creer, DirectorJfSy* 
Division of Public Utilin.es 
STATE OF 17.AH 
DEPARBENT OF 
BUSINESS RIGllATION 
NORMAN H. B^NGEKTER COMRSCP. 
WILLIAM I DUNN. EXEC17M DiRECTOr. 
RE: Case No. 87-999-01 
Investigation of the Effects of the Tax Reform Act o£ 
1986 on Mountain Bell, Utah Power & Light Company and 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
RECOMMENDATION 
This is an update to the memorandum of February 20, 1987 
concerning the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1966 on 
Mountain Bell, Utah Power & Light Company and Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company. The Division of Public Utilities continues to 
recommend that each company be treated on an individual basis. 
Each company will have a lower tax liability under the new tax 
law. The lower tax liability is offset by other factors which 
would cause rates to consumers to rise. The Division has 
opposed one item general rate cases in the past and is not 
changing its position. The Division therefore recommends that 
the Commission not lower the rates of any of the companies just 
for the effects of the 1986 Tax Act. The Division will 
continue to monitor each company's earnings on a monthly basis 
to determine if significant changes occur. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 1987, The Committee of Consumer Services filed a 
petition with the Commission requesting the Commission to 
reserve the ability to make refunds or adjustments in rates to 
reflect the effects of the Tax Act. The Committee suggests the 
Commission could do this by designating the rates of each 
company currently in effect as temporary rates or by ordering 
each company to establish a reserve or special account for the 
tax saving*. The Committee still maintains its original 
position that each company should be ordered to reduce its 
rates to pass through to its customers the tax savings. 
While the Division has no aversion to the Commission 
reserving the ability to make refunds to customers of tax 
savings, it see* no great need to do so. Income taxes are one 
of the operating costs of each company and the Division does 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES/ RALPH K CREEK n ' i . 
HEBER M. WELLS BUILONG MO EAST KC SOUTH PO BOX 4JK2 SALT LAKE a r t UTAH MMS-OWl A , 
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not see n^y great need to treat taxes different an any other 
operati*.j cost of a company which has increaseu or decreased 
since the last general rate case of each company. The effect 
of the tax changes may or may not be any more significant than 
other changes that have occurred. If the Commission accepts 
the position of the Division, there will be no need to grant 
the petition of the Committee. 
The Division has received and analyzed additional 
information that it requested from Mountain Bell, Utah Power & 
Light Company and Mountain Fuel Supply Company concerning the 
effects the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have on each company. 
The findings of the Division are summarized by company in the 
balance of this memorandum. 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
The Division has updated and expanded the analysis 
previously submitted to the Commission. The information in the 
first memorandum covered eleven months of actual data and one 
month of estimated data for 1986 and preliminary budget data 
for 1987. Table 1 shows the 1986 revised earnings and equity 
returns based on actual data for the full year. It also 
includes a further analysis showing the effect of certain 
Commission adjustments made in the 1985 rate case. The 
Division only included those adjustments which are still 
applicable. Items adjusted were directory advertising, 
management bonuses, cash working capital and interest 
synchronization. Differences in equity returns as shown in 
Table 1 from those previously reported are minor. 
TABLE 1 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
(Dollars in Millions) 
1986 Actual Unadjusted 
1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987 
Tax Changes 
1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987 
Tax and Cost Changes 
Earnings 
$56.2 
59.5 
57.4 
Return 
on 
Equity 
11.74% 
12.76* 
12.06% 
1986 Actual Adjusted for 1987 
Tax and Cost Changes and 
Commission Rate Case Adjustments 59.1 12.58% 
returns as shown in Table 2. The effects of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act are already incorporated in the budget figures. The 
"Budgeted Unadjusted" results differ from those previously 
reported because of certain budget refinements The "Budget 
Adjusted" results reflect the effects of the removal of inside 
wire and increased sales taxes. Inside wire was removed 
because it was deregulated on January 1, 1987. The Division 
also included an analysis of the effects of Commission 
adjustments made in the 1985 rate case. The final adjustment 
in the analysis shows the effect of a potential accounting 
change for Post Retirement Medical/Dental benefit- 'PRM&D) when 
added to the other adjustments. 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
(Dollars in Millions) 
1987 Budget Unadjusted 
Budget Adjusted 
1987 Budget Adjusted and 
Commission Rate Case Adjustmei its 
1987 Budget Adjusted, Commission 
Rate Case Adjustments and 
PRM&D Costs 
Earnings 
$54 9 
5 3.3 
55/3 
52.1 
Return 
o n 
Equity 
] 1 7 6% 
11,2 2% 
1 1 Ibl 
io 7cn 
Attachment 1 i s the updated version of the schedule' 
attached to the previous memorandum. It has been updated to 
reflect changes in separation procedures and depreciation rates. 
The Federal Communication Commission has recently approved 
the Joint Board's recommended changes in separation procedures 
relating to central office category 6 local dial switching 
equipment and category 8 circuit equipment. These changes will 
result in a shift in costs from the interstate to the 
intrastate jurisdiction. The separation changes become 
effective on January 1, 1988 
The next regular tri-annual represcription of depreciation 
rates will occur in 1988. Mountain Bell estimates that its 
depreciation study (to be filed later this year) will show the 
need for additional intrastate depreciation expense in the 
range of $7 to $10 million. A conservative estimate of $4 
million was used in Attachment eflect the intrastate 
impact Ot aepi.cv»j.aw4.wft« *. r^t.*«w*. A^WAW.. -w„ «^ww. 
Attachment 1 shows that the estimated increase in earnings 
for 1987 and 1988 due to the tax changes are nearly offset by 
various cost increases that are not currently reflected in 
rates. Budget information for 1988 is not available to 
evaluate other effects, such as changes in rate base, revenues 
and operating expenses. 
The lower tax liability in 1987 and again in 1988 will 
largely offset such things as changes in separation procedures 
and depreciation rates that would otherwise require rate 
increases. Continuation of stabilized rates is better than the 
"yo yo" effect of a rate reduction now and a rate increase in 
the near future. Equity returns under the various scenarios in 
Tables 1 and 2 are well below the present authorized return and 
very likely below any level that the Division might recommend 
in a general rate case. 
The Division recommends that the Commission not order 
Mountain Bell to reduce rates for the reduction in Federal tax 
rates. The Division monitors Mountain Bell's earnings on a 
monthly basis. If significant changes occur in terms of 
excessive earnings, the Division will petition the Commission 
to lower the company's rates. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Utah Power answered a Division request by supplying the 
information shown in Attachment 2 to this memorandum. The data 
shows the company's estimate of the Utah jurisdictional effects 
of the Tax Reform Act and the increase in revenue requirement 
due to the increase in Utah jurisdictional rate base since the 
company's last general rate case. 
The company calculated that the effects of the changes in 
the tax law would decrease Utah jurisdictional revenue 
requirement for 1987 by $11.1 million. However, Utah 
jurisdictional rate base has increased by $259.8 million since 
the last general rate case. This creates an increased revenue 
requirement of $69.8 million. 
There are also other cost increases and decreases which 
would affect the revenue requirement for 1987. For example, if 
the authorized return on equity were reduced from the current 
rate of 15.0 percent to a rate of 12.0 percent, the reduction 
in revenue requirement would be $49.7 million. The Division 
currently believes that a reasonable return to allow on equity 
capital under existing market conditions would be in the range 
of 11.7 to 12.5 percent. 
The results of the Division's examination is in basic 
agreement with the data supplied by the company. Rates to 
consumers could be reduced from $10 to $15 million based only 
on the savings from the new tax law. However, if all general 
rate case items were considered, the company could probably 
justify a rate increase. 
Utah Power also supplied the financial indicator data for 
1986 as shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
19 8 6 
Return on Common Equif f, 
Total Company 11.9 9% 
Total Company - Electric 9.91% 
Total Utah - Electric 11,09% 
Earnings Per Share: 
Before Coal Case H e f u in a $ 2 2:6 
Coal Case Refund $ 78 
AfterCoalCaseRefund $ 2 4 8 
Times Interest Earned 2 30 
Internal Generation of Cash 8 7.00% 
The 1986 earnings per share of $1.48 after the coal case 
refund were less than the annual dividend rate of ^$2.32 per 
share. The company stated that its 1987 earnings are expected 
to be less than those for 1986. However, recent cost cutting 
measures by the company should increase the current earnings to 
about the 1986 level of $2.26 before the coal case refund. 
After reviewing the information supplied by Utah Power, 
the Division concludes that the savings resulting from the new 
tax law are substantially offset by increases in other costs, 
principally the increase in rate base. The Division will 
continue to monitor the earnings of Utah Power and will 
petition the Commission for a rate reduction if the earnings of 
the company become excessive based on current costs of capital. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
The Division has analyzed the effects of the Tax Act on 
Mountain Fuel by looking at how the tax changes affect the 
actual results of operations of the company for 1986 and the 
projected results for 1987. The analysis on Attachment 3 to 
this memorandum shows that the company would have a spread 
between $3.4 million excess and $5.1 million deficiency in the 
Utah revenue requirement depending upon the year, capital 
structure and the return allowed. 
Based upon actual 1986 operating figures, including income 
taxes at the 1986 tax rates and capital structure and costs of 
capital as authorized in Mountain Fuel's last rate case, the 
company had a revenue requirement deficiency of $3.2 million. 
Adjusting the 1986 results of operations reflect the effect 
of the Tax Act, about $ 3 4 millionchanges the deficiency into 
- 5 -
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on equity to 13 percent would produce an adjustment of $3.2 
million which would make a total adjusted excess for 1986 of 
$3.4 million. Adjusting the capital structure and capital 
costs to the levels that existed in the beginning of 1987 and 
leaving the return on equity at 13 percent, would reduce the 
excess to $2.1 million. 
The company's projected 1987 plant investments and 
increased operating costs cause a revenue requirement 
deficiency of $5.1 million based on the capital structure and 
costs of capital allowed in the last case. The change to a 
revenue requirement deficiency is caused by additional 
investment in rate base and increased operating expenses. The 
additional costs associated with the increase in rate base and 
operating expenses is greater than the increase in operating 
revenues. With the return on equity set at 13 percent the 
deficiency changes to $1.8 million under the authorized capital 
structure and $3.1 million under the 1987 capital structure. 
Mountain Fuel's actual operations for 1986 produced a rate 
of return somewhat lower than authorized in the last case, and 
even when adjusted for the 1987 tax changes, the return is only 
slightly higher than authorized. The company's 1987 
projections show that the forecasted rate of return on equity 
should decline significantly. It would take significant 
downward adjustments to the company's projected investment 
levels and operating costs and a rate of return on equity less 
than 13 percent to produce a disparity large enough to justify 
a rate decrease. The Division recommends that the Commission 
not reduce the company's rates. The Division will continue to 
monitor the company's operations in 1987 and if earnings become 
excessive will petition the Commission for a reduction in the 
company's rates. When tax rates further decrease in 1988, the 
company may at that time have excess earnings to warrant a show 
cause hearing. 
Copies to: 
Utah Power & Light Company 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
Mountain Bell 
Committee of Consumer Services 
William E. Dunn 
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Attachment 1 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Impact on Earnings 
Increase/(Decrease) 
1987 1988 
Tax Changes 40% Rate 34% Rate 
Tax Rate Reduction $ 4.3 $ 8 8 
Excess Deferred Tax Flow Back 2.3 4 4 
C a p> in, I a 1 1 1 a 11 o i J i l o n s 11; u c t i o in i,' o s t s ( (2 9 ) 
Loss of Portion of Business 
Expense Deduct ion (o I ) (0 1) 
Investment Tax Credit Depreciation 0.1 0 I 
Investment Tax Credit 
Amortization (Flow Back) (0.4) (0.4) 
Net Increase in Earnings 
from Tax Changes $ 3.3 $ 9.9 
Cost Changes 
SPF Phase down 
CPE Phase-out 
Uniform System of Accounts 
Capital to Expense Shifts 
Depreciation Represcription 
Central Office - Categories 6 and 8 
Net Decrease in Earnings 
from Cost Changes 
Net Increase in Earnings 
- 7 -
( 0 . 7 ) 
( 1 . 4 ) 
$ ( 2 - 1 ) 
S 1.2 
V 
s. 
( 1 . 4 ) 
( 2 . 1 ) 
( 1 . 8 ) 
( 2 . 5 ) 
(1,11 
„L±:J.l 
0 . 5 
oassi 
Attachment 2 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
UTAH JURISDICTION 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 1986 AND OTHER COST CHANGES 
12 MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1987 - ESTIMATED 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Revenue Requirement 
Increase/(Decrease) 
Tax Changes 40% Rate 34% Rate 
Expenses: 
Federal Taxes Increase $ 14.7 $ 2.4 
Deferred Tax Expense Decrease (13.6) (18.1) 
Lost Investment Tax Credit (13.7) (12.5) 
State Tax Increase 0.7 0.7 
Rate Base*Impacts: 
Accumulated Deferred Taxes 0.8 1.1 
Net Decrease in Revenue 
Requirement from Tax 
Changes 
Cost Changes 
Increase in Utah Jurisdictional Rate 
Base since last case filed January 
9, 1984: 
Rate Base Increase $259.8 $259.8 
Revenue Requirement Including 
Depreciation (Tax effects 
included above) $ 69.8 $ 69.8 
- 8 -
00552 
Attachment 3 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
UTAH JURISDICTION 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 19 86 AND OTHER COST CHANGES 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Based on Capital Structure A, 
in Last General Rate Case: 
Utah Non Gas Revenue Deficiency 
Based on Return Authorized in 
Last General Rate Case 
Effect of Applying 1987 Tax 
Changes to 1986 Actual Data 
Net 
Revenue Requirement 
Increase/(Decrease) 
1986 1987 
Actual Projected 
Operations Operations 
$ 3.208 
(3,439) 
(231) 
Effect of Lowering Equity Return 
to 13% (reflects both return 
and associated income tax 
affects) (3,161) 
Net 
$ 5 147 
N.A. 
5,147 
(3,391) 
$ 1,756 
Based on Capital Structure Existing 
in the Beginning of 1987: 
Utah Non Gas Revenue Deficiency 
Based on Return Authorized in 
Last General Rate Case $ 2,777 
Effect of Applying 1987 Tax 
Changes to 1986 Actual Data (3,352) 
Net (575) 
Effect of Lowering Equity Return 
to 13% (reflects both return 
and associated income tax 
affects) (1,525) 
Net 
* « • , # / / 
N . A . 
4,777 
f\ f\ £- fm
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September I, 198 7 
Public Ser\ ice Commission 
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el, Manager^//* 
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From: Ralph Creer, Director 
Tom, Pe 
Re: Investigation of the Effects 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 on 
Mountain Bell (Case No. 87-999-c 
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STATE OFLTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER. OOMRSTF. 
WILLIAM E. DUNS. EXECUTIM DIRECTS 
This is an update to the memorandum of June 5f 1987 concerning 
the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Mountain Bell 
earnings. In the prior memorandum, the Division stated that it 
would monitor earnings of the Company on a monthly basis 1o detect 
any aignifleant change in the equity return. 
The Summary Table on page 2 provides potential 1987 equity 
returns comparing our previous report which used 12 months budget 
dsta and this report which utilises five months actual and seven 
months budget data* 
DIVISION OP PUBLIC U T U T I B / RALPH K. CREEK, DIRECT: 
HEMIM. WEL1S U U 3 W C HO EAST W SOUTH PO BOX 45132 SALT LAKE OTY, UTAH 84MWKI (801) 3W-* • 
A n n a n H i v 1 0 
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The Summary Table shows higher 1987 equity returns,, utilizing 
different scenarios, when compared with the returns previously 
reported in our June 5, 1987 report to the Commission. Although the 
returns are higher, we still do not recommend action by the 
Commission at this time. The actual unadjusted return of 12.44 
percent is well below the authorized return of 14.2 percent. The 
highest return shown in the Table of 13.43 percent we believe would 
fail within a range of reaaonableness for Mountain Bell equity 
capital. 
Tha Diviaion will continue to aonitor Mountain Bell's earnings 
on a monthly baaia during tha balance of tha year and will subait 
another report later in tha Fall* At that time we will have a 
better aaaeaaaent of 198? earninga and equity returna, January 1, 
1988 ooat shifts, and 1988 budget year data* We will than make a 
determination whether an edjuataent to lower rataa would ba 
appropriate. 
co: William I. Dunn, Diractor 
Mountain Ball 
Committee of Consumer Servicee 
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SUMMARY TABLE 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
UTAH INTRASTATE OPERATIONS 
Return on Eauity 
1987 
As previously 
Reported 
12 mos. Budget 
5 mos. Actus. 
7 mos. Budg'-1 
'M Actual Unadjusted <•> N.A. 1 2 . 4 -! \ 
(2) Actual/Budget Unadjusted 76% 13.43% 
(3) Actual/Budget Adjusted 11.22% 12.8?% 
{'.) Actual/Budget Adjusted and 
Commission Rate Case Adjustment« 11.78% 13.22° 
(5) Actual/Budget Adjusted, Commission 
Rate Case Adjustments and PBMeD (*>> 10.70* 12.18% 
(*) Based on annumlixation of actual data. Excludes budget da-a. 
(b) Post Retirement Msdieal/Dental benefits (PRMeD). A new 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) technical bullet.n 
has been issued to provide interim guidaaos on changes in the 
method of aooounting for post-retirement benefits other than 
pensions. The PASB final ruling on this matter is expected 
during 198i. Booking in 1987 appears doubtful. 
00555 
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4m FLOOR. HEBER M. WELLS BUILOING. 160 EAST 300 SuUTH 
P.O. BOX 45585, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-8716 
3RMANH. ^NGERTER 
GOVERNOR 
September 28, 1987 
COMMISSIONERS 
BRIAN T. (TEO) STEWART, CHAIRMAN 
BRENT H. CAMERON 
JAMES M. BYRNE 
EXECUTIVE STAFF DIRECTOR 
DOUGLAS CW. KIRK 
COMMISSION SECRETARY 
STEPHEN C. HEWLETT 
Ralph N. Creer, Director 
Division of Public Utilities 
Department of Business Regulation 
Building Mail 
Dear Ralph: 
It has been brought to our attention by Joe Dunlop, who 
has been monitoring Mountain Bell's earnings, that Mountain Bell 
is close to earning in excess of its authorized rate of return• 
Mr. Dunlop9s analysis, based upon data obtained from the monthly 
reports supplied by the Company, indicates that for the last 12 
months, July 1986 to July 1987, Mountain Bell has earned 14.21 
percent on equity* The trend on this moving average is still 
upward and indicates that Mountain Bell will continue to improve 
on its earnings. 
We request that the Division undertake an investigation 
of the financial returns of Mountain Bell to evaluate whether 
there is a need to initiate a rate case* Please include in your 
evaluation an analysis of the impact of the following: 
* Tax Reform Act of 1986 
* Changes in the capital market 
* Impact of depreciation (Current depreciation accounts 
as well as the Louisiana Court decision) 
Proper accounting for the early retirement programs 
Offsets that may impact rate base* * 
Please do not feel 
investigation to these items. 
necessary to limit your 
Your attention I : : i I 1 I i i i- | • i • - I • 1 1 1 be appreciated. 
Sincerely 
Stewart 
BTS/bs 
cc: Mountain Bell 
Committee of Consumer Services 
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Tab 12 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Investi- ) 
gation of Access Charges for ) 
Intrastate Inter-LATA and ) 
Intra-LATA Telephone Services.) 
CASE NO. 83-999-11 
QRPSR 
Appearances: 
Stanley K. Stoll 
Thomas M. Za*r 
A. Robert Thorup 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Denver C. Snuffer 
Milton L. Morris 
Randy L. Dry^r 
James J. Cassity 
Ted D. Smith 
Floyd A, Jensen 
Michael Ginsberg, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Sandy Mooy, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
For 
ISSUED: February 11. 1988 
Tel-America of Salt Lake 
City, Inc. and Telecom-
munication Resellers of 
Utah 
U.S. Sprint Communications 
Company 
Access Long Distance 
Amtel Corporation 
AT&T 
M.C.I. 
Exchange Carriers of Utah 
Mountain Bell 
Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Requlation, 
State of Utah 
Committee of Consumer 
Services 
By the Commission* 
Pursuant to notice duly served, a prehearing conference 
and also a Motion to Approve Stipulated Interim Charges on Access 
Charges for Intrastate Intra-LATA and Inter-LATA Telephone 
Services in the above-captioned matter was held on the 22nd day of 
AnnanTliv 1 O 
CASE NO, 83-999-11 
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December, 1987, before the Commission at its offices at 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
This matter was previously heard by the Commission and 
an Order entered on October 29, 1985. A subsequent Order was 
entered on February 6, 1986 denying petitions for review and 
rehearing by clarifying certain other items as described more 
fully in that Order. A further Order was issued on March 7, 1986 
clarifying the effective date of tariffs and related Orders were 
issued on May 1, 1986 and June 24, 1986 denying Petitions for 
Review and Rehearing and a petition to reopen the proceedings. 
These various Orders were subsequently appealed under 
the names Telecommunication Resellers of Utah v. Public Service 
CoTOUSSipni 3t Sit and Tel-America of Salt Lake Citv. Inc. v. 
PubUg S3rvj<?3 gonqnjggipni 3t ajt, Utah Supreme Court Case Nos. 
860124, 860285 and 860400. On November 30, 1987 the Supreme Court 
set aside the Order of October 29, 1985, establishing the tariffs 
in this matter, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to 
determine just and reasonable access charges based upon Utah-
specific cost data. 
The parties met prior to the hearing on December 22, 
1987 and reached a Stipulation on interim access rates for the 
time period from and after December 22, 1987 until a final order 
in this matter, and the parties have also agreed upon a schedule 
for further proceedings. 
On December 7, 1987, Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") filed revised tariffs 
scheduled to become effective December 22, 1987. The Commission 
CASE NO. 83-999-11 
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approved those revised tariffs to become effective on the 
revested date pursuant to our "Order Approving Accelerated 
Effective Date for Revised Tariffs,f in Case No. 87-049-T35, dated 
December 10, 1987; that Order and said tariffs are incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
The Stipulation of the parties was received on the 
record in this matter on December 22, 1987 and provides that the 
rates set forth in Mountain Bell's Access Charge Tariff Rates, 
which became effective December 22, 1987, shall also become the 
Interim Rates in this matter commencing December 22, 1987 and 
until such time as a final Report and Order is issued in this 
matter; said Interim Rates shall be subject to refund. 
The issues relating to the rates to be effective from 
the date of our Order of October 29, 1985 to December 22, 1987 and 
the final rates in this matter shall be issues reserved for the 
hearing in this matter. 
The following individual members of the Exchange 
Carriers of Utah have concurred in the Access Charge Tariff Rates 
of Mountain 3ell pursuant to the Stipulation: 
Gunnison Telephone Company 
Beehive Telephone Company 
South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc. 
Central Utah Telephone, Inc. 
Utah-Wyoming Telecom 
Kamas Woodland Telephone Co. 
Uintah Basin Telephone Association, Inc. 
Skyline Telecom 
Emery County Farmers Union Telephone Association, Inc. 
Manti Telephone Company 
The Commission takes notice of its own records in this same matter 
to the effect that Union Telephone Company, Inc., another member 
- 4 -
of the Exchange Carriers of Utah, does not concur in Mountain 
Bell's access tariff and has, instead, filed its own P.S.C. Utah 
No. 3 Access Service Tariff scheduled to become effective March 1, 
1988. A related Motion for Approval of Interim Tariff is pending. 
The parties have also agreed upon a schedule which is 
set out in detail in the Order that follows. 
Pursuant to the Motion and Stipulation of the parties, 
the Commission enters the following: 
ORPER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That: 
1. The Stipulation of the parties in this matter is 
allowed and confirmed and, except as to Union Telephone Company, 
Inc. only, the Access Charge Tariff Rates of Mountain Bell 
effective December 22, 1987 are fixed as the Interim Rates in this 
proceeding, such Interim Rates to be subject to refund in the 
event that the final rates fixed by the Commission are lower than 
the interim rates, in which event Mountain Bell and the respective 
members of the Utah Exchange Carriers shall refund any difference 
to their respective customers for the time period commencing 
December 22, 1987 and ending on the effective dates of tariffs 
filed pursuant to the final Report and Order in this matter. 
2. The Interim Rates of Union Telephone Company are 
reserved for further consideration pursuant to a hearing presently 
scheduled; Case No. 88-054-01. 
3. The following schedule is adopted for this 
proceeding: 
CASE NO, 83-999-11 
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•;'^ ruary 10, 1988 Mountain Bell shall prefile its prepared 
testimony; 
March 1, 1988 The Exchange Carriers shall prefile their 
prepared testimony; 
June l# 1988 Other parties shall prefile their respective 
prepared testimony; 
July 1, 1988 Rebuttal testimony shall be filed by all 
parties; 
July 6, 1988 9:00 a.m. - Second Prehearing Conference will 
be held; 
July 11-15, 1988 Hearing dates at the Commission offices, 
commencing at 10:00 a.m., July 11, 1988. 
4. The response period for discovery is shortened from 
30 to 20 days. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 11th day of February, 
1988. 
/s/ grian Tt ?tewarti chairman 
(SEAL) (s( gr?nt Ht cajnergni Cprnmisgipner 
/s/ James M. Bvrae. Commissioner 
Attest: 
/s/ Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary 
Tab 13 
- 32F0SS THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 0? UTAH -
AMSRICA:; SALT COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation/ 
Complainant, 
vs. 
M. S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Respondent. 
CASE MQ, 35-192-01 
REPORT A!TD ORDER 
Aaoaarancss: 
Merlin 0. 3aker 
Enid Greene 
Charles M. 3ar.nect 
John L. Fallows 
ISSUED? September 12, 1995 
For \-~. S. r*atch Company 
" American Salt Company 
oy tha Commission: 
Tha hearing on W. S. Hatch Company's >"Hatch") Motion 
to Dismiss tha Complaint filed against it by American Salt 
Company ("American Salt") was heard on July 2, 1925 at 10:00 a.m. 
before Administrative Law Judga A. Robert Thurman, at tha Commis-
sion Officii, 4th Floor, Heber M. Walls State Offica Building, 
160 East 330 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Having bean fully 
advised in tha premises, tha Administrative Law Judga enter3 the 
following Report containing proposed Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law* and tha Order based thereon. 
IT:TRQSUC?;O:T 
From April 15, 1984 to May 3, 1994, W. 3. Kazch Company 
(hereafter "Hatch") hauled 406 truck lcad3 of salt, totalling 
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pproximateiy 17,702 tons, for American Salt front the Ama:-: 
Magnesium Company ponds to the American Salt plant at 
Grantsville, Utah. Part of the haul was over a public highway cf 
the state of Utah, a fact known by American Salt at the tine tha 
•haul took place, but which Hatch did no^ know, mistakenly believ-
ing the entira haul to ba over privata roads and thus not subject 
to regulation by this Commission. Hatch charged less than its 
tariff rata for tha haul because of the mistake. 
After tha haul ended, Hatch discovered tha mistake and 
billad American Salt for Hatch's services according to the tariff 
rata than on file with and approved by this Commission. American 
Salt rafusad to pay tha amount hilled, basing its refusal on an 
alleged oral agreement of a rata lever than tha published tariff 
rare. 
Hatch filed suit in tha United States District Court 
for tha District of Utah seeking payment fcr its transportation 
services according to tha tariff rata. American Salt imr-adiately 
thereafter filed a Verified Complaint and Application for Relief 
from Sxcassiva Charges with this Commission, claiming that 
Hash's tariff rata was ur.raascr.able ar.d un4"st under the cirrum-
s*:»..-.C23. 
Tha patitic-nar, Amorioan 3a*.-:, filed a varifia* ?ati-
ti::. sattir.? forth cartain facts t:: v/hish it bsssd its aila-
r-.-i-n? thaz tha nuhlishad tariff raia va* -ir.j'.st and unritaor.-
».:?.* 2 undar tha circumstancas. Hate::, m su-cirt o.' its ::s«i«a t: 
Ci*.ris3, filed supporting affidavit?. 
3 
In view of the verified complaint and affidavits filed 
herein, and the factual admissions of the parties, the 
Corliss ion, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, will consider Hatchfs Motion t<j Dismiss as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds that there is no genuine issue as 
to the following material facts: 
1. The haul performed by Hatch for American Salt was 
r.ada, in part, over a public road of the state of Utah. 
2. American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a 
public road at the time the haul took place. Hatch believed 
the haul no be made entirely over private roads* 
3. Hatch hauled 406 loads of salt from the Amax 
Magnesium Company Ponds to the American Salt plant at 
Grantsville, Utah, averaging 43.6 tons each, totalling 
approximately 17#701.60 tons. 
4. At the time of the haul, Hatch had a salt tariff on 
file that had been properly submitted to and approved by 
this Commission* The Public Service Ccrmission has examined 
and approved Hatch1s salt tariff on numerous occasions. The 
Commission hat found the salt tariff to be just and reason-
able. 
5. Hatch's tariff rat2 for sait was S.35 per hundrec 
weicht at the time of the haul. 
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6. The cost for the services Hatch performed for 
American Salt, calculated according to the tariff rate, was 
$123,911.20, plus applicable dead-heading charges. 
7. No application was made to this Commission to 
change the tariff rate applicable to this haul. 
8. American Salt made payments to Hatch in the total 
amount of $33,667.40, leaving an unpaid balance of 
$90,243.80 plus dead-heading charges. 
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 54-6-3 (1953) specifically 
provides that a comnon motor carrier operating any motor vehicle 
within the state of Utah may not transport either persons or 
property for compensation over the public highways except in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Motor Carrier Act. 
2. Utah Code Annotated 5 54-3-6 (2) (1953) further 
provides that no common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or 
receive compensation different from that specified in the tariffs 
filed with the Commission and in effect at the tine transporta-
tion services are rendered. 
?.. Under the law, .*meric*r. -3alt is charged v:ith tha 
knowledge that any haul over the Utah piiolic highways is su^-ict 
to the laws of the state of Utah and, therefore, to the applic--
bla tariff provisions on file v:ith and approved cr this 
c;.sr tip. 85-i?2-o: 
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4. The salt tariff on file with the Commission is fair 
?.nd reasonable, and Hatch is legally required to collect the 
charges for transportation services as provided in said tariff. 
5. Any oral or written agreements t<f charge a rats 
higher or lower than the published tariff rate, even assuming 
that such was agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void and 
unenforceable. 
6. Any agreement or representation by Hatch that it 
would accept less than the applicable tariff rate in payment for 
its services, assuming such agreement or representation was made, 
is also void and unenforceable. 
7. American Salt is required under the laws of the 
State of Utah to pay the tariff rate for the transportation 
services performed and other charges as set forth in said tariff. 
Hatch is entitled to compensation for its services in the amount 
of $123,911.20 for the salt hauled, together with all ether costs 
as provided by its applicable tariff, less the payments previous-
ly made by American Salt. 
ORDER 
MOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERFDY ORDERED, That Respondent 
*:.--S. Hatch Company's Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint 
filed against it by American Salt Company is granted and said 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED a: Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12uh day of 
September, 1985. 
Is! A. Robert Thurman 
Admir.istrazve law Judce 
- 6 -
Approved and confirmed this 12th day of September, 
1935, as the Report and Order of the Commission. 
I si 3rent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) /s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner -
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
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CALLISTER. DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
FRED W. FINLINSON 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys foe American Salt Company 
UVH°t3. . 
SERVICE COMMISSI 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation. 
Complainant. 
vs. 
W.S. HATCH CO.. a Utah 
corporation. 
Defendant. 
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 85-192-01 
* * * * * * * 
FRED W. FINLINSON and CHARLES M. BENNETT of Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker. attorneys of record tor American Salt 
Company, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 54-7-15 (1981). 
hereby respectfully request that the Public Service Commission 
grant a rehearing in the above-entitled matter with regard to 
the Report and Order entered on the 12th day of September. 
1985. American Salt Company further requests that upon 
rehearing, the Public Service Commission vacate the Order and 
Appendix 14 
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Report and order this case to proceed to an adjudication on the 
merits. In support of this Application, American Salt Company 
files herewith its Memorandum together with Affidavits setting 
forth the reasons why the decision is incorrect and unlawful. 
DATED : this ( day of £fey>£i*^ 1985. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Attorneys fo 
Company 
erican Salt 
CDN2736B 
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CALLISTER. DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
FRED W. FINLINSON 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for American Salt Company 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation. 
Complainant. 
vs. 
W.S. HATCH CO.. a Utah 
corporation. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 85-192-01 
* * * * * * * 
FRED W. FINLINSON and CHARLES M. BENNETT of Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker. attorneys for American Salt Company 
("American Salt11), respectfully submit this Memorandum in 
support of American Salt's Application for Rehearing in the 
above-entitled matter. 
0354 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
American Salt has set forth in detail in its Second Amended 
Verified Complaint the facts which led to this proceeding. 
While many of American Salt's allegations are not in dispute, 
some of the facts have been disputed by Hatch in these 
proceedings. Since the Report and Order dated September 12, 
1985 (the "Report and Order11) dismissed American Salt's 
Complaint pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, the Public 
Service Commission (the "Commission") is required to accept 
American Salt's verified allegations (and the logical 
inferences therefrom) as true for purposes of this proceeding. 
Boven v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434. 436 (Utah 1982). 
For the convenience of the Commission, American Salt has 
attached a copy of each statutory reference in support of its 
Application as Exhibits A-l through A-10. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 1984, due to the abnormally high and rising level of the 
Great Salt Lake, American Salt was faced with an emergency 
condition. The decreasing salinity of the lake's salt water 
- 2 -
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together with the possibility of the flooding of American 
Salt's evaporation ponds threatened American Salt's salt 
supply. As a result, American Salt contracted with its 
neighbor Amax to purchase salt from Amax. Amax mines magnesium 
and other minerals from its solar evaporation ponds on the 
Great Salt Lake. To Amax, salt is a waste product. In order 
to haul the needed quantity of salt in the amount of time 
available, American Salt needed additional hauling capacity. 
The Hatch - American Salt Hauling Contract 
As a result, in April, 1984, American Salt and W.S. Hatch & 
Co. ("Hatch") entered into first an oral, then a written, 
contract (the "Contract") for the hauling of salt by Hatch from 
the Amax ponds to American Salt's plant at Solar, Utah. Based 
on competitive market conditions, the rate set forth for 
hauling the salt was less than 50% of Hatch's published general 
tariff rate. Among other matters, the Contract required Hatch 
to "furnish and provide all licenses and permits required by 
state, federal or local authorities; . . . ." Transportation 
Agreement, page 2. The hauling was done between April 16 and 
May 2, 1984. Unknown to American Salt, Hatch failed to seek or 
obtain Commission approval of the Contract. 
- 3 -
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Hatch Also Hauled Salt for Morton Salt 
From 1980 to 1985, Hatch made at least four similar hauls 
of salt for Morton Salt. Each of the hauls was made from the 
Amax ponds to Morton Salt's plant at Solar, Utah, approximately 
20 miles east of American Salt's plant. Each of the hauls was 
also made at less than 50% of Hatch's published general tariff 
rate. However, Hatch in these four cases sought and obtained 
Commission approval of these rates. In support of the haul 
which was begun in May, 1985, Hatch alleged that the haul was 
necessitated by emergency conditions and that the lower rate 
was "just, reasonable and in the public interest.'• Hatch's 
Application, dated May 6, 1985, p. 2, Case No. 85-192-02. 
The Contract Dispute 
After the American Salt haul was completed. Hatch and 
American Salt disagreed as to the amount due Hatch under the 
Contract. Hatch claimed a total of $40,231.00 was due. 
American Salt paid $33,667.40. Thus, the total amount in 
dispute under the Contract is $6,563.60. The issue in dispute 
is which of the parties was responsible for delays which 
occurred in shipping the salt and the added costs those delays 
- 4 -
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entailed. When American Salt indicated it disagreed with what 
Hatch claimed was due and owing. Hatch threatened to charge 
American Salt under its general tariff rate unless American 
Salt paid the charges as demanded by Hatch. When American Salt 
refused. Hatch filed suit in federal court seeking an 
additional $90,000 based on its general tariff rate. 
Commission Proceedings 
Thereafter, American Salt filed its complaint before the 
Commission seeking relief from the unjust, unreasonable and 
discriminatory actions of Hatch. A hearing was held before 
Administrative Law Judge A. Robert Thurman on July 2, 1985. 
Judge Thurman entered his Report and Order on September 12, 
1985 dismissing American Salt's application for relief, and the 
Commission approved his Report and Order that same day. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
While there are several disputed facts, there is one 
finding of fact in the Report and Order which American Salt 
strenuously disputes. That finding is: "Hatch believed the 
haul to be made entirely over private roads." Report and 
Order, Finding No. 2 p. 3. 
- 5 -
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Hatch Knew a Public Road Was Involved 
American Salt has uncovered additional evidence that 
challenges Hatch's asseccica that ic did not know a public coad 
was involved. The Affidavit of Roger Peterson filed herewith 
includes a copy of a freight bill completed by one of Hatch1s 
drivers which shows that Hatch's agents knew that a county road 
was involved no later than April 23. 1984. (The haul began on 
April 16 and was terminated on May 2. 1984.) 
The Road is Well Known and Marked 
Moreover. Hatch hauled salt over the very same road on two 
earlier occasions for Morton Salt. The road itself is a well 
known and historic public road, having been in use over one 
hundred years, it is the only road which grants access to 
Stansbury Island- Additionally, both the entrance off the 
public road to AMAX's property and to American Salt's property 
had gateways, indicating the boundary line of the respective 
properties anci putting users on notice that private property 
rights were beginning. See map accompanying Affidavit of Roger 
Peterson, dat«d September 30. 1985. 
6 -
0359 
Hatch Must Show None of its Agents and Officers Knew 
Brad Kilpatrick filed an Affidavit, dated June 27. 1985. in 
which he states he assumed only private roads were involved. 
Affidavit of Brad Kilpatrick, p. 2. However. Hatch is charged 
with the knowledge of all of its agents and officers -- not 
just Brad Kilpatrick. Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1974). Brad Kilpatrick states Lee Nicks and Phil 
McCauslin accompanied him on his initial inspection. There is 
no affidavit from Mr. Nicks, and Mr. McCauslin's affidavit is 
totally silent as to his knowledge. If any officer or agent of 
Hatch knew the road was a public road, that knowledge is 
imputed to Hatch. 
Hatch is Charged with Constructive Knowledge 
Finally. Utah Code Ann. Section 54-6-3 (1953) requires 
Hatch to charge shippers in accordance with the Code provisions 
when a haul is made over a "public highway." "Public highway" 
is a defined term which includes any public thoroughfare. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-6-1 (1975). In view of the crucial importance 
the nature of the roadway has on Hatch's duties under the Code. 
Hatch, as a regulated common carrier, should be charged with 
- 7 -
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knowledge of all public highways. Therefore, Hatch is 
precluded from arguing its alleged mistake. 
Thus, it is improper to find that Hatch did not know a 
public road was involved. Moreover, even though American Salt 
is entitled to relief if this finding were true, the finding is 
objectionable because of the inherent implication that Hatch 
acted reasonably in this matter. Any implication of propriety 
on Hatch's part is improper. Hatch violated both its statutory 
and contractual duties. Hatch's sole motivation in this matter 
has been greed - the possibility of an $83,000 plus windfall. 
Clearly, Hatch has no concern for what is just and fair. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. THE COMMISSION HAS THE POWER AND THE DUTY TO GRANT RELIEF 
TO AMERICAN SALT IN THIS CASE. 
A. The Commission's Power is Both Specific and Plenary. 
The Utah legislature has enacted statutes which require a 
common carrier to publish tariff rates and to charge shippers 
pursuant to those published rates* subject to the supervision 
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of the Commission and certain statutory exceptions. Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953); § 54-4-1 (1975); § 54-4-4 (1975); 
§ 54-6-4 (1975); and § 54-6-10 (1953). The underlying purpose 
of these statutes is to insure that common carriers charge 
shippers just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (1975); Hatch's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated May 21, 1985, 
pp. 2, 4, 8. Thus, the Commission is given the specific 
authority, as well as the duty, to investigate charges, rates 
and practices, including general published tariff rates, to 
determine whether a charge, rate or practice is unjust, 
unreasonable or discriminatory. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) 
(1953); S 54-4-4 (1975); S 54-6-4 (1975). In the event the 
Commission determines a rate to be unjust, unreasonable or 
discriminatory, the Commission is given the power to enter 
orders which correct the unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory 
charges. This power is both specific (Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 
(1953); § 54-4-4 (1) and (2) (1975); § 54-6-4 (1975); § 54-6-10 
(1953); and S 54-7-20 (1953)) and plenary (Utah Code Ann. 
S 54-4-1 (1975); White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 9 U.A.R. 9, at 10 (Utah 1985) ("Under the authority 
of U.C.A. 1953, S 54-4-1 (Supp. 1983), the PSC has the power to 
issue orders regarding any matter within its jurisdiction.'1 
Emphasis added.)). 
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B. American Salt has Alleged Facts Which Establish that 
Hatch's Charges, Rates and Practices are Unjust. 
Unreasonable and Discriminatory. 
Hatch's Rates Are Discriminatory 
American Salt's central contention is that the application 
of Hatch's general tariff rates under the facts of this case is 
not only unjust and unreasonable, but furthermore it is 
discriminatory. In analyzing this contention, American Salt's 
allegation that Hatch's rates are discriminatory is 
particularly important. The Utah Code strictly prohibits 
preferences. Section 54-3-8 provides in part: 
No public utility shall, as to rates, 
charges, service, facilities or in any other 
respect, make or grant any preference or 
advantage to any person, or subject any 
person to any prejudice oc disadvantage. 
. . .The Commission shall have power to 
determine any guestion of fact arising under 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 (1953). What makes American Salt's 
case compelling is that its allegation of discriminatory 
treatment is based on undisputed facts. 
- 10 -
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Preferences Granted To Morton Salt 
In at least four recent instances Hatch has sought and 
received Commission approval to charge a special commodity rate 
for the hauling of salt for Morton Salt, a direct competitor of 
American Salt. In May, 1985, Hatch began hauling salt 
approximately 30 miles for Morton Salt at a cost of $3.25 per 
ton. If Hatch is successful in imposing its general tariff 
rate against American Salt, American Salt will be required to 
pay a hauling charge of $7.00 per ton for an 11 mile haul. The 
Morton Salt hauls and the American Salt haul were made from the 
same point of origin (the Amax Ponds), traveled the same route 
(until the turnoff to American Salt's property), and 
transported the identical product (salt). Under the Contract, 
Hatch offered a similar rate to American Salt, but Hatch failed 
to obtain the "licenses and permits11 it was required to obtain 
for American Salt. These facts conclusively establish that the 
application of Hatch1s general tariff rates to the American 
Salt haul is discriminatory. 
Hatch's General Tariff Is Uniust and Unreasonable 
Beyond discrimination, the facts of this case establish 
that the imposition of Hatch's general tariff rate is unjust 
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and unreasonable. Both parties agree that a dispute arose over 
the amount of the payments due Hatch after the haul was 
completed. Even if Hatch were entirely correct in its 
interpretation of the Contract and it were owed the additional 
$6,500.00 in dispute. Hatch is now seeking to have its general 
tariff rates applied so that it can obtain an $83.000.00 
windfall on a $30,000 to $40,000 contract. The total payment 
would be three times larger than what Hatch claimed it was due 
under the Contract. While it cost American Salt only $2.00/ton 
to refine the salt, the cost of transportation under Hatch's 
general tariff is 3-1/2 times that cost. If, in addition to 
this, the preferential rate granted to Morton Salt is 
considered, the application of Hatch's general tariff rate to 
this haul is clearly unjust and unreasonable. 
Thus, American Salt respectfully submits that the 
Commission has the responsibility to act in this matter to 
prevent an unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory application 
of Hatch's general tariff rates. 
C. Judge Thurman Misapplied the Law in this Case. 
Judge Thurman in the Report and Order submitted the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
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1. Utah Code Annotated § 56-6-3 (1953) 
specifically provides that a common motor 
carrier operating any motor vehicle within 
the State of Utah may not transport either 
persons or property for compensation over 
the public highways except in accordance 
with the Utah Motor Carrier Act. 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6(2) (1953) 
further provides that no common carrier 
shall charge, demand, collect, or receive 
compensation different from that specified 
in the tariffs filed with the Commission and 
in effect at the time transportation 
services are rendered. 
Report and Order, p. 4. Without more, these statements are not 
an accurate application of Utah law to the facts of this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-3 (1953) requires common carriers to 
comply with all provisions of the Act -- not just those 
provisions which require a common carrier to charge according 
to its published tariffs. Among other provisions, common 
carriers must extend uniform contracts to shippers (Utah Code 
Arm- SS 54-3-6(2) (1953) and 54-3-7 (1953)) and must not 
subject any shipper to any prejudice or disadvantage (Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-3-8 (1953)). In view of the allegations of American 
Salt that Hatch violated its duty under these sections of the 
Code, the key issue is whether the Commission is powerless to 
prevent the unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory application 
of Hatch's tariff. 
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A Full Reading of Section 54-3-6(2) supports 
American Salt's Position that the Commission has Power 
to Order Relief in this Case. 
Section 54-3-6(2) provides JLjn toto: 
No common carrier shall charge, demand, 
collect or receive a greater or less or 
different compensation for the 
transportation of persons or property, or 
for any service in connection therewith, 
than the rates, fares and charges applicable 
to such transportation as specified in its 
schedules filed and in effect at the time; 
nor shall any such carrier refund or remit, 
in any manner or by any device, any portion 
of the rates, fares or charges so specified, 
except upon order of the Commission as 
hereafter provided, or extend to any person 
any privilege or facilities in the 
transportation of passengers or property 
except such as are regularly and uniformly 
extended to all persons. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953). By clear statutory 
construction, these underlined words conclusively show that the 
Commission has the power to order a carrier to remit its 
charges even though those charges are based on schedules on 
file at the time the haul occurred. See also, Utah Code Ann. 
S 54-3-7 (1953). Indeed, without the underlined words, this 
section would be inconsistent with the Commission's mandate to 
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investigate rates, charges and practices and onier ippupria.* 
'relief Utah Code _ Ann *i •  4 • 4 • i u * 7 b i , § b4 • ,i 8 (195 3); 
§ S4-4 "4 iJ'iHM: § 54-6-4 (1975); and fc S4 7-20 (1953). 
Even though ^ublic Utilities has been 
somewhat unsympathetic to American Salt's claims in this 
proceeding, its attorney, Brian W. Burnett, agreed that 
Sections 54 * • i *rM ^A-^-t(il) do nor Hii^ *.ne Commission's 
power in this natter: 
I do, however, believe that the reparation 
statute 54-7-20 allows the Commission to 
take a look at charges that have been made 
in certain circumstances, and in determining 
whether or not, in view of those 
circumstances, the charges were unjust, 
unreasonable or discriminatory. 
Transcript of July 2. 1985 Hea . . .. -
Thus, as explained in paragraph A, pp. 9-10 above, tie 
Commission has both plenary au.l specific authority to grant the 
*r ^quested. 
_
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D. The Commission Should Exercise its Authority to 
Protect American Salt from Hatch*s Unjust, 
Unreasonable and Discriminatory Charges, Rates and 
Practices. 
While ignoring the gross inequities it has caused. Hatch 
has argued two practical reasons that no relief should be 
granted to American Salt: 
1. Any relief would undermine tariffs; and 
2. Any relief would encourage disgruntled shippers to 
seek Commission help after the fact, arguing that the 
common carrier's rate was unjust and unreasonable. 
Hatch's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
dated April 30, 1985, p. 8; Transcript of July 2, 1985 Hearing, 
p. 14. Indeed with regard to this second matter. Hatch argued 
"anybody could come in anytime." Transcript of July 2. 1985 
Hearing, p. 14. 
Mr. Burnett, on behalf of the Division of Public Utilities, 
stated that the Division had similar concerns: 
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As £ mentioned to you before, the only 
interest the state has is maintaining the 
sanctity of tariffs and making sure that we 
aren't deluged with a number of people who, 
after the fact, complain about their tariff 
being unjust and unreasonable. 
Transcript of July . *&b Heari in ettect these 
points lie know led i power of .- Commission to act, hut 
question whether the Commission should jcant relief became of 
the ruling's impact in other areas I'h.?s<* points should iiot 
dissuade the Commi ssion from granting relief in this case. 
Tariffs Should Not Be Sanctified 
With regard to protecting tariffs, American Salt submits 
that the focus is wroi lg It is not tariffs that need to be 
protected -"t rather the purpose foe which tariffs were 
instituted to prevent unjust, unreasonable and 
discriminatory rates i.hai needs protection. If the 
application of a tariff is unjust, unreasonable and 
discriminatory, the Commission should grant relief from tl lat 
tariff. To ho] d otherwi se, on the basis of" the "sanctity of 
iAI iffs"r would ignore the Commission's legislative mandate to 
protect the public interest by insuring that; tales di: A I US t , 
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reasonable and nondiscriminatory. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission. 135 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1953); Utah 
Code Ann, § 54-4-4 (1975). 
The Commission Has a Duty to Act 
As to preventing the anticipated deluge, American Salt 
suggests the Commission has a duty to prevent unjust, 
unreasonable or discriminatory rates even if other shippers 
might be inclined to seek similar relief. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-4-4 (1975); § 54-6-4 (1975). Indeed, administrative 
convenience, while a legitimate concern, should not outweigh a 
legislative mandate to insure just, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory rates. 
However, even if the Commission disagrees and decides to 
weigh the impact of an order of relief on the administration of 
tariffs generally, relief can still be granted by the 
Commission in this case in any number of narrow ways which 
would protect the Division of Public Utilities from the deluge 
of disgruntled shippers which it fears. 
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The , Relief Granted Can Be Very Narrow 
The facts ot this case are extraordin ihe application 
of Hatch * s gene i a 1 I, d i: 1 f t \ s unjust
 # unreasonable and 
discriminatory. Moreover, Hatch had a s'alutory and 
contractual duty to take steps which would \\ti\*# pi; evnnt r-ml this 
result. Thus, re 1 ie£ c:an i<»e grant.ed on a narrow basis. 
If the Commission decides to grant *: • narrow way, 
the oi:df«i ut lelief cuuhl Tor example require the shipper to 
meet a •hree fold test: First, the shipper would have to show 
that the application of the general tariff tali* unitei the 
: ireumst L'Micefi ot \ tin JM* w^uld be unjust, unreasonable or: 
discriminatory. Second, the shipper would have to show that 
the carrier had a duty permitted 
«I»KI f»pnwn I i'ira i "I 8 genera
 A ac.fi .* * ** Finally, the shipper 
would have to show tha ** carrier had fulfilled ia s July 
and sought the statute exception, the statutorily 
permitted exception would have been granted. The order of the 
Commission would then be granted enjoining the carriei to 
apply for tue »ta exception and by having the 
Commission approve the application. 
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As can be seen, this approach would not open Pandora's 
box. The burden of proof under this three-fold test would 
prevent shippers from using this case to avoid the normal 
application of general tariff rates. Moreover, the ruling of 
the Commission under this approach would insure the "sanctity 
of tariffs" (assuming arguendo that tariffs deserve 
sanctification) because the relief granted American Salt would 
be made pursuant to a statutorily permitted exception and 
Commission approval of that exception. 
II. CONCLUSION. 
American Salt alleges facts, many of which are undisputed, 
which establish that the application of Hatch's general tariff 
rate to the facts of this case is unjust, unreasonable and, 
most importantly, discriminatory. To uphold the application of 
Hatch1s general tariff rate on the basis that a statutory 
mandate is being fulfilled is incomprehensible. The mandate is 
not to strictly enforce tariffs; rather it is to protect the 
public interest through the use of tariff rates to insure just, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
public Service Commission. 135 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1953); Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (1975). The number of statutory provisions 
which grant the Commission the authority and responsibility to 
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investigate charges, rates and ptatiicvs which are alleged to 
be unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory makes the 
Legislature's intent crystal clear. Accordingly when American 
Salt proves its case un t tu- merits, the Commission should grant 
the requested relief. 
American Sail tespect f u i i,y Lequests that the Commission 
vacate the Report and Order and that this case proceed to an 
adjudication on the merits. 
Dated th is j ~ day of ^ > ^ x i 98b 
CDN2737B 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
^Attorneys fc neys for ican Salt Co 
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CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for American Salt Co. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
AMERICAN SALT CO , ,i I'Aldw^re 
corporation, 
Complainan 
Appellant, 
vs. 
W.S. HATCH CO., a Utah 
corporation; THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OP UTAH; BRENT H. 
CAMERON; JAMES M. BYRNE; and 
BRIAN T. STEWART. 
Respondents. 
American Salt Cc ("American Sa)> v, by Its counsel, hereby 
files the following Docketing Statement with the Court pursuant 
to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985). 
1. The Supreme Court's Jusidictional Authority. The 
Supreme Court has authority to hear this appeal pursuant ro J 
Writ of Review issued by the Supreme Court to the Public 
APPELLANT'S DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 860048 
category No 9 
Appendix 15 
Service Commission of Utah (the "PSC") under U.C.A. § 54-7-16 
(1953). 
2. Concise Statement of the Nature of the Proceeding. 
This appeal is a review of an Order of the PSC dismissing the 
Verified Complaint of American Salt against W.S. Hatch Co. 
("Hatch"). 
3. Dates of Order. Rehearing and Petition for Review. 
The Report and Order from which this Appeal has been taken was 
issued by the PSC on September 12, 1985. Thereafter, a 
petition for rehearing was filed by American Salt on October 2, 
1985. The petition for rehearing was denied pursuant to an 
Order entered December 24, 1985. The Petition for Review of 
the Report and Order of the PSC was filed with the Supreme 
Court on January 15, 1986. 
4. Concise Statement of Material Pacts. American Salt 
mines salt from its solar evaporation ponds next to the Great 
Salt Lake in Tooele County, Utah. In the spring of 1984, 
American Salt was faced with the potential flooding of its 
ponds as a result of rising water level of the Great Salt 
Lake. As a result, American Salt contracted with its neighbor 
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Amax, to purchase salt from Amax so tlui1" Amei . .."an Salt could 
insure a »*ont i nu< \i H snt-ipl1, uf salt *o* its customers 
It was necessary for American Salt im niuvt- • tie sail in a 
short period of tine and American Salt did not have the hauling 
capacity to do this. Accordingly. American Salt entered into 
an oral, and then a written, contract with, Hatch to help ™~"<=» 
the salt Hatch :i s a common motor carrier of property. "( ..A. 
S 54-6-1 (1975), and is subject to regulation by the PSC 
U. C. A. S 5 4-4-1 11975) T h e c o n 11 a. • t i > i: i c e w a B b e twe e n 
one- toil i" 11'! ijinii] uiie- i,l -" of what; the haul w o u l d have cost had 
it been made pursuant Hatch's published tariff rates. 
part of the contracts. Ha t c h <* g r * * d •. < J O l> e a in a 11, necessary 
perm w •!"" :;i *pp«vals from, the PSC so that the haul could be 
made based on the contract. 
Pcr'/i. to * ml «4)Eter the time of the American Salt—Hatch 
haul, Hatch hauled salt for Morton Salt from the Amai pood to 
Morton Salt Company1 These hauls were 
perf- .iii between one-third and one-half of Hatch's 
published tariff rates. With regard to these haule Ha i n 
applied for and obtained speci al commodity rates from the PSC. 
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Hatch hauled salt for American Salt in mid April through 
early May, 1984. Hatch did not obtain a special commodity rate 
before, during or after its haul. Hatch claims that it was 
operating under a mistake of fact, believing that it did not 
need to obtain a special commodity rate because the haul was 
being made entirely over private roads. This claim by Hatch is 
disputed by the allegations in American Salt's Verified 
Complaint and the affidavits on file in this proceeding. 
After the haul was completed, a dispute arose as to how 
much was owed Hatch under the contract. When agreement could 
not be reached with Hatch, Hatch threatened to charge American 
Salt under its published tariff rates if it was not compensated 
pursuant to its view of the contract ($40,231.00). American 
Salt refused to make payment based on Hatch's interpretation of 
the contract, but American Salt did pay Hatch based on a 
compromise between what Hatch was claiming and what American 
Salt thought was owing on the contract ($33,667.40). 
Nonetheless, Hatch filed an action in the Federal District 
Court in the Central Division of Utah to recover under its 
published tariff rates ($123,911.20 plus dead heading charges). 
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After the Complaint was filed by Hatch in the Federal 
District Court. American Salt filed a Verified Petition with 
the PSC seeking to have Hatch's published tariff rate declared 
unreasonable, unjust and discriminatory under these 
circumstances and asking the PSC for relief from excessive 
charges. Hatch moved the PSC to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. After a hearing before Administrative Law Judge 
A. Robert Thurman, Judge Thurman issued a Report and Order 
which was adopted by the PSC on September 12, 1985 dismissing 
American Salt's Verified Complaint and entering Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. A copy of that Report and Order 
are attached to this Docketing Statement. This Appeal ensued. 
5. Issues Presented in this Appeal. The issue presented 
in this case is whether the PSC erred when it dismissed 
American Salt's Verified Complaint where: 
A. There existed a statutorily permitted exemption 
which would have governed the haul made by Hatch for American 
Salt. U.C.A. § 54-6-10 (1953). 
B. Hatch knew of the exemption, contractually bound 
itself to obtain the exemption, and then failed to obtained the 
exemption. 
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C. Hatch, both before and after this haul, obtained 
the exemption for American Salt's chief competitor, Morton Salt. 
D. Hatch made no attempt to obtain an exemption for 
American Salt before, after or during the haul. 
E. Hatch demanded Forty Thousand Two Hundred 
Thirty-One and No/100 Dollars ($41,231.00) based on its 
interpretation of the contract. 
P. American Salt has paid Thirty-Three Thousand Six 
Hundred Sixty-Seven and 40/100 Dollars ($33,667.40). 
Q. Hatch is seeking to be paid an additional Ninety 
Thousand Dollars ($90,000) plus under its general tariff rate 
for the haul made. 
H. Utah law specifically prohibits discriminatory 
treatment by common carriers between shippers. 
I. Utah law grants specific and plenary authority to 
the PSC to investigate allegations of unreasonable, unjust or 
discriminatory rates, charges or practices, and to order 
appropriate remedies. 
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6. Statutes and Cases Determinative of the Issues 
Stated. American Salt relies on the following statutory 
provisions: Utah Code Ann. S 54-3-6(2) (1953); § 54-3-7 
(1953); S 54-3-8 (1953); § 54-4-1 (1975); § 54-4-4 (1975); 
S 54-6-4 (1975); § 54-6-10 (1953); and § 54-7-20 (1953). 
American Salt also relies on White River Shale Oil Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 9 U.A.R. 9, at 10 (Utah 1985). 
7. Related Appeals. There are no related appeals in this 
matter. 
8. Attachments. Attached hereto are the following 
documents: 
A. PSC's Report and Order dated September 12, 1984; 
Be The PSCs's Order Denying Rehearing dated December 
24, 1985; 
C. American Salt's Petition for Review of Report and 
Order of the PSC dated January 15, 1986. 
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Respectfully submitted 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
BV /sti*^ M^L^ctf— 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for American Salt Co. 
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